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I. INTRODUCTION
As global data flows are inevitable, the increasing power of the European
Union's innovative data privacy regulation, the General Data Protection
Regulation ("GDPR")' that entered into force on May 25, 2018, is becoming
evident to the world.2 The GDPR has not only influenced other countries to adopt
new privacy regulations,3 but it has also triggered enormous compliance
obligations, especially by United States ("U.S.") companies doing business in
Europe. The GDPR has a significant territorial and extra-territorial scope that
covers data processing not only within the European Union ("EU") and for its
consumers4 but also where data is processed outside of Member State territory
with respect to EU citizens.5 The GDPR regulates how companies, public
organizations, governments, and businesses can use and process personal data,
including anything from data collection, mining, data aggregation, or sharing of
data.6 For these reasons, the efforts of businesses and their lawyers to comply
with the recently adopted GDPR to avoid its harsh penalties have strengthened
the so called "Brussels Effect,"7 namely the EU's ability, as characterized by Anu
Bradford, to unilaterally influence global regulatory standards because of its
General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 0.J.
(L 119) 1, 34 (EU), art. 51(4) [hereinafter GDPR].
2 Major GDPR Fine Tracker-An Ongoing, Always Up-to-Date List of Enforcement Actions,
COREVIEw, https://coreview.com/blog/alpin-gdpr-fines-list/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2020).
3 See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REv. 771, 777
(2019) (citing Graham Greenleaf, The Influence of European Data Privacy Standards Outside
Europe: Implications for Globalization of Convention 108, 2 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 68, 77
(2011)).
4 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 3(1)-(2).
5 Id. art. 3(2)(b).
6 See What Does It Do?, GDPR, https://gdprexplained.eu (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
7 See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 8 (2012).
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large market.8 However, the breadth and the scope of the Brussels Effect and its
regulatory influence remains unclear. Across the Atlantic, the need to regulate
data privacy has exploded due to the increasing litigation against Facebook.9 This
led to the first relatively sizable Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") fine while
sparking more congressional action towards a federal data privacy bill.
If the GDPR has led to awareness of and compliance with data protection
regulation for U.S. consumers, state legislatures have taken new important
measures to regulate consumer privacy. Bills like the California Consumer
Privacy Act ("CCPA"), which entered into force on January 2020, provide a
sectoral model, narrower than the GDPR,.10 However, U.S. state legislatures are
far from taking a comprehensive regulatory path similar to the GDPR. Many
states are committed to raising the data privacy protections by following what
David Vogel has called, with respect to environmental legislation, the
"California effect,"" which is spreading rapidly across U.S. jurisdictions through
the CCPA.
The non-convergence of data privacy regulation between the EU and the
U.S. can be traced back to the different underlying cultural and legal attitudes,12
the diverse political economy regimes towards data privacy, and the path
dependencies of more or less decentralized regulatory systems.'3 In an effort to
clarify the GDPR, this Article explains how the EU's decentralized
administrative structure also has a centralized constitutional adjudication by the
Court of Justice of the EU ("ECJ"). It has inevitably contributed some
implementation features to the GDPR. This in turn makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to export the European data privacy regulation even in a federal
polity like the U.S.
The complexity of the GDPR architecture is difficult to replicate and
includes an uneven implementation as well as open-ended rules for the Member
States to transpose further into domestic legislation.'4 Besides, the harmonizing
8 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 176 (2006).
9 Litigation on data privacy has highlighted the concerns regarding the processing of data by
social media. In April 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that
Facebook users have a reasonable expectation to privacy and can bring suit against the social media
platform for tracking of web browsing which violates their privacy. In re Facebook, Inc. Internet
Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2020). According to Chief Judge Thomas, "Facebook set
an expectation that logged-out user data would not be collected, but then collected it anyway." Id.
at 602.
10 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-80 (West 2020).
" See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP 248 (1995).
2 James Q. Whitman, Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE
L.J. 1153, 1155-57 (2004); see also 47 U.S.C.A § 230 (West 2020).
1 See COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (Susan Rose-Ackerman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2019);
COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION 7 (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2018).
14 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 1, arts. 6, 9.
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jurisprudence of the ECJ has strengthened fundamental rights and the dignitary
approach to data privacy embedded in the GDPR. This has led to inevitable
regulatory choices on the right to be forgotten often in opposition to the right of
free speech that remains at the core of the U.S. legal regime.
15 If the dignitary
dimension of data privacy as a fundamental right derives from the German
constitutional tradition,16 U.S. consumer privacy privileges of free choice and
liberty are compatible with free speech protections.17 Finally, embedded in some
of its political economic regime, the GDPR ex-ante regulatory approach with the
right to opt-in'" departs from the ex-post regulatory CCPA approach with the
right to opt-out. This latter approach offers a limited control to monitor the
collection or processing of consumer data unless the business is aware that the
consumer is under 16 years of age.'9
This Article deploys some of the findings of the comparative
administrative law literature and the theory of institutional change
20 to show that
despite the fact that the GDPR is globally relevant for companies and lawyers
concerned with data privacy compliance, its adoption among U.S. regulators is
highly unlikely. This comes from the structural (and constitutional) difference of
values underpinning data privacy across the Atlantic. It is not by chance that, in
the consumer protection field, the CCPA emerged as a powerful alternative in
the U.S., showing that once again the California Effect, described by Vogel in
the realm of environmental law, is crucial to state and federal regulators alike.
The CCPA adopts a less dignitary but consumer-oriented approach to data
privacy regulation based on political, economic choices entailing ex-post market
intervention, more active consumer litigation, and eagerness to balance
consumer protections with economic incentives for online platforms in its
jurisdictions. This inevitable Balkanization of data privacy regulation will create
discrepancies in regulations and new costs to businesses in addition to greater
experimentation in the realm of data privacy. This will train regulators and the
courts to openly engage with the distributive costs of data privacy, whether
limiting or enhancing access to platforms, their content, or individual rights. The
current state of data privacy regulation in the U.S. shows more broadly that the
reception and transfer of the GDPR to other countries, despite its adequacy and
its regulatory innovation, remains uncertain because of administrative path
dependencies and the uneven enforcement of the GDPR in the EU.
15 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
16 See Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta, Transatlantic Privacy Regulation: Conflict and
Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 264 (2015).
17 See id.
18 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 15(3).
19 Id. arts. 4, 32.
20 See James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change, in
EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 1 (James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010).
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To achieve this purpose, Part II focuses on the EU and underlines how
privacy and data protection have consolidated with a focus on the role of the ECJ
in creating a fortress of personal data. Part III underlines how, despite the
consolidation of privacy and data protection in the EU with the adoption of the
GDPR, there are still areas of discretion in defining the boundaries of EU data
protection law as shown by the role of the European Commission and the
discretion of Member States in implementing some provisions. Part III also looks
at how the ECJ has dealt with the jurisdictional issue in cases involving the
extensions of EU law beyond territorial boundaries. Part IV focuses on the U.S.
framework, precisely underlining the lack of an overarching federal data
regulation, the centrality of the First Amendment, the role of consumer privacy,
and the fragmentation of legislation at the national level. Part V provides a
comparative perspective focusing on specific problems characterizing the
approaches to data privacy across the Atlantic.
II. EU CONVERGENCE IN DATA PRIVACY
A. Historical Perspective of Data Privacy in the EU and the U.S.
To fully understand the issue of the scope of the GDPR and of the EU
digital right to privacy being implemented beyond the borders of the EU, in a
sort of extraterritorial effect, it is necessary to develop some premises. Precisely,
it is worth focusing on the dynamic force of the European fundamental right to
data protection and privacy in the digital world and the cleavage between the
European vision of the right to privacy online and data protection and the
American one.
Regarding the protection of fundamental rights of privacy and personal
data, if it is true that the milestone for the reconstruction of the birth and evolution
of the protection of privacy and personal data is the "American" theorization of
Justice Warren and Justice Brandeis,2' it is also ascertained that, compared to the
U.S. legal system, in Europe, the protection of personal data and digital privacy
acquired the status of a fundamental right.22 Actually, this fundamental right
assumes the nature of a super fundamental right,23 which seems not to find any
limits in the territorial dimension of the EU, following EU residents even in the
2 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
22 In the ECHR system, see S. & Marper v. United Kingdom 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 167. In the
EU system, see Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR, Hartmut
Eifert v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. 1-11063.
23 In "data privacy-oriented" case law of the European Court of Justice, the nature of a "super"
fundamental right could be confirmed by the lack of any reference to freedom of information in
the reasoning of the Court, that does not even mention Article 11 (freedom of expression) in its
judgments. It cited the economic freedoms a few times, but even this balance soon disappeared.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espahola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
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data processing outside the EU territory, and does not meet many limits in the
balancing process between fundamental rights.
This evolution started in the second half of the twentieth century in the
European Convention on Human Rights system. In this case, the right to privacy
has been codified, and the system looks at it as a sort of habeas corpus concerning
a person's spatial and relational projections.24 As in the U.S., in the European
constitutional framework, the recognition and codification of the right to privacy
were originally made along the "negative" line, that is the recognition of the
citizens' right to have their own private life respected.
25 However, in the
following decades, this right underwent a deep transformation. Indeed, because
of an acceleration of technology, a "positive" dimension of the right to the
protection of personal data has enriched the "negative" dimension, typical of the
right to privacy. This widening of the right to privacy to include protection of
personal data has marked an expansion of a right initially limited to the
"traditional" concept of privacy.2 6 In this scenario, the European Court of Human
Rights has played an important role in addressing technological changes and the
challenges of online data processing.27
Against this background, the institutions of the then European
Community were slower to codify a right to data protection or digital privacy,
due to their original economical inspiration. For a long time in the EU legal
system, individual rights have been recognized almost exclusively in order to
ensure economic fundamental freedoms. As a consequence, in this context, it
was difficult to make the protection of personal data a matter which could capture
the attention of the European institutions for its direct impact on some
fundamental rights.
24 The first document at the European level that incorporated the right to privacy was Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950. What Is the European Convention on
Human Rights?, EQUAL. & HUM. RTs. COMM'N (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/what-european-convention-human-rights.
25 See generally European Privacy Framework, PRIVACY EUR., https://www.privacy-
europe.com/european-privacy-framework.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2020); The Right of Privacy,
EXPLORING CONST. RTs., http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
26 The first step was the Convention on the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, the so-called Convention no. 108/1981. Finally, in 1987, the
European Court of Human Rights clarified that the collection and processing of personal data must
be included within the scope of Article 8. Leander v. Swed., 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 116 (1987);
see also Amann v. Switz. 2000-Il Eur. Ct. H.R. 245; S. & Marper v. U.K. 2008-V Eur. Ct. H.R.
167; M.M. v. U.K., 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1906.
27 In 2007, the web was formally included in the scope of application of Article 8. Copland v.
U.K. 2007 Eur. Ct. H.R. 253; see also Wegrzynowski & Smolczewski v. Pol., 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.




2020] THE BALKANIZATION OF DATA PRIVACY REGULATION
The breaking point was Privacy Directive 95/46.28 Even if an economic
dimension inspired it, the Directive was the first legal instrument in the EU legal
system that promoted the harmonization of privacy and data protection rules at
the EU level. It established both general principles concerning the processing of
personal data and special rules based on specific and particular processing. In
this scenario, the embryonic fundamental right to personal data protection and
digital privacy started to acquire a concrete declination. Actually, the recognition
and "constitutionalization" of this right was closely connected to the evolution
of the EU's identity, and, perhaps, was an additional reason for the creation and
consolidation of this super fundamental right. The right to the protection of
personal data and digital privacy was finally codified in the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU and enshrined in Article 16 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the EU,29 which provides the legal basis for the adoption of a new
regulatory framework for the processing of personal data. Specifically, the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU devotes two provisions to the matter
Article 7, concerning the respect for private life and family life, and Article 8,
regarding the protection of personal data.30
From the American perspective, it is clear that the right to privacy
designed by Justices Warren and Brandeis as the "right to be let alone" has
experienced a process of migration from the United States to Europe.3 1 It has
progressively acquired a dimension that does not exclusively protect the
individual's expectation of privacy, but which sees it in the definition of a system
of principles and rules for data protection-a further essential moment to protect
the individual personality.
The European system created a unicum, an innovative and pervasive
right to data protection and right to privacy, that has transfigured the Internet
environment and has deeply influenced other legal systems generating a new
28 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
29 OFF. J. OF THE EUR. CMTYS., CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(Dec. 18, 2000), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/texten.pdf.
30 CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION arts. 7, 8. Despite the attempt
in the explanatory notes to the Charter to restrict the purpose of this provision to a mere
reproduction of the existing acquis (see Explanations regarding Article 8 of the Charter), the
contribution of Article 8 is quite significant. Not only has this provision permitted to provide the
right to data protection with constitutional rank, it also did definitively emancipate the latter from
its connection to the economic dimension that characterized, at least at the outset, Council
Directive 95/46/EC. Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke GbR,
Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, 2010 E.C.R. I-11063. For more details, see Part II of this paper.
3 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21.
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migration of this right.32 However, this migration was preceded by a very
pervasive case law of the European Court of Justice oriented at applying the
European vision of the right to digital privacy on the Internet-or better on every
hosting provider operating in Europe-and then was followed by European laws,
above all the GDPR.
While the EU fundamental right to data protection and digital privacy
wrapped its tentacles around the Internet, guaranteeing to EU citizens the
protection of their European rights in the digital world, the U.S. system was stuck
in the quicksand of the definition of the right to privacy, granting a right to data
protection only in some specific fields.3 3 Additionally, it has to be stressed that
in the U.S., the main role in protecting users' data was played-at the federal
level-by the FTC34 and not by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In this scenario, we register a clash between the U.S. perspective and the
European one. While the EU has established secondary rules (mainly the GDPR)
to protect this new fundamental right to privacy and data protection and has
accordingly regulated the Internet, the U.S. system has not introduced a general
regulation. Moreover, it must be underlined how most Internet companies are
based in the U.S. and are deeply influenced by the European rules since the
European market is one of the most important for Internet companies.
35 It is
above all concerning the U.S.-based giants of the web-Facebook and Google in
primis-that extraterritorial scope takes shape36 (but, for instance, some scholars
have also analyzed how the super right to digital privacy could affect American
newspapers and publishers37). This phenomenon concerns not only the U.S., but
also the other two main actors in Internet regulation: the EU and China. China is
32 Krystyna Kowalik-Banczyk & Oreste Pollicino, Migration of European Judicial Ideas
Concerning Jurisdiction over Google on Withdrawal of Information, 17 GERMAN L.J. 315, 318
(2015).
3 Bignami & Resta, supra note 16. For a discussion on the "third party doctrine" and the
general idea of privacy in the U.S., see Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51
B.C.L. REv. 1511, 1520 (2010).
34 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 2230, 2267 (2015); cf DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 2-6
(2008).
3 The European market has been an important market for tech giants to offer their services.
Unlike other areas of the world which are subject to surveillance and control of digital activities
like China, the liberal characteristics of the internal market have allowed tech giants to grow in
Europe even if recently the Union has shown its intent to increase regulatory pressure over tech
giants. Adam Satariano & Monika Pronczuk, Europe, Overrun by Foreign Tech Giants, Wants To
Grow Its Own, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/19/business/europe-digital-economy.html.
36 Kimberly A. Houserb & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: The End of Google and Facebook or a
New Paradigm in Data Privacy, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6-7 (2018).
37 Those scholars have also analyzed how this would be inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Kurt Wimmer, Free Expression and EU Privacy Regulation: Can the GDPR Reach
U.S. Publishers?, 68 SYRACUSE L. REv. 547, 561 (2018).
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less connected with the other two systems in terms of cross-border data flow.38
Therefore, the U.S. legal regime seems to be the most embroiled in the struggle
for data protection online, and this topic can be understood in the broader one
relating to the digital revolution.39 In this perspective, the issue of the
"Europeanization" 40 of data protection appears to be a very central topic that
contains a challenge to the digital sovereignty of third countries, especially in the
U.S.
With regard to data privacy, two aforementioned elements, the new
fundamental right to digital privacy and data protection in the EU and the
difference in regulations (and balance of fundamental rights) between the EU
and the U.S., have generated a phenomenon called "Europeanization"-the
application of EU law beyond the borders of the EU territory-of data protection
online.
B. The Centralizing Role of the European Court of Justice
The GDPR is the rightful heir of a precise jurisprudence of the ECJ and
the same court seems to be the main actor in the widening of the scope of EU
law. In this perspective, digital privacy is probably the best-case study for
analyzing the European "imperialism" on the Internet. In addition, the EU
approach to digital privacy seems to be embraced by the ECJ in the free speech
field, inaugurating new eventual trends in this perennial conflict between
different digital sovereignties on the web.
To get a better understanding of the ECJ's approach when it comes to
new technologies, the decision invalidating the data retention Directive
2006/24/EC must be analyzed.4 1 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for
Communications42 appears to be a leading case concerning the grade of
protection the Charter guarantees to the right to respect private life and to the
protection of personal data. In this scenario, the European judges did not pass up
the chance to invalidate, for the first time in the history of the European
38 Nicholas F. Palmieri III, Data Protection in an Increasingly Globalized World, 94 IND. L.J.
297, 302-03 (2019); see also Griffin Drake, Navigating the Atlantic: Understanding EU Data
Privacy Compliance Amidst a Sea of Uncertainty, 91 S. CALIF. L. REv. 163, 175-76 (2017).
39 Cf Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and
Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1966, 2003-08 (2013).
40 The expression has been used both to describe the internal phenomenon of harmonization
and centralization of data protection, Orla Lynskey, The "Europeanisation" of Data Protection
Law, 19 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 252, 255 (2017), and to depict the tendency to widen
the territorial scope of the EU Law. In this last sense the xpression shall be used in this paper.
41 Directive 2006/24, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, 2006
O.J. (L 105) 54.
42 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Commc'ns,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶ 1-5 (Apr. 8, 2014).
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integration process, an act of secondary EU law as a result of its inconsistency
with the European Charter of fundamental rights.43
At the heart of the legal dispute there was the possibility afforded by the
Directive to let the national authorities obtain very intrusive and delicate
information about many aspects of the private life of users of
telecommunications service providers. This case is particularly important
because it has highlighted the difference between the right to private life and the
right to data protection and its autonomous regime as stressed by the Advocate
General Cruz Villalbn's opinion.44 In this sense, a restriction consistent with
Article 7 of the Charter could not be compatible with the protection granted by
Article 8 of the Charter, and vice versa. Moreover, an additional, innovative step
was taken in the reasoning of the Court. Indeed, the balancing process was
enriched off a scrutiny based on the provision of Article 52(1) of the Charter,
specifically concerning, on one hand, a possible violation of the essence of the
rights provided by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and on the other hand, the
respect of the principle of proportionality regarding the measures specified by
the Directive to achieve the objectives of safeguarding public order and
preventing terrorism, which are legitimate aims according to the court.45
Concerning the violation of the essence of rights, an infringement of the
essence of both the right to privacy and the right to data protection was not found
by the court. Consequently, in the first part of the balancing process, the aims
sought by those measures, the prevention of terrorism, et cetera, allow a
restriction of rights codified in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. However, it is in
relation to the second profile of Article 52, the assessment of the proportionality
of the collection and storage of data, that the court has found a breach of EU
primary law. Under those aspects, the court has claimed that both the notion of
"serious crimes"-too inaccurate and generic-and the lack of specific
guarantees-from both a substantive and a procedural standpoint-regarding the
actions of national authorities were incompatible with the principle of
proportionality.4 6
Although this case involves a territorial use of data, the decision sets up
the legal bases of the centripetal force of the EU right to data protection. Indeed,
what is important in this decision is the high standard of the EU system in
protecting fundamental rights of privacy and data protection and the beginning
of a reconstruction of the super right to digital privacy. Additionally, the last
innovative aspect of the decision is the use of the principle of proportionality. In
this perspective, it could also be highlighted that by referring to the principle of
proportionality as a "separate" element of the balancing process, the Court has
43 Id.
44 Id. ¶55.
45 Id. ¶1 54-55.
46 Id.
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the possibility to both find new "infringements" of the super right to privacy
online and to limit that right in order to not infringe the digital sovereignty of
third states. However, in the ECJ's decisions, the second path seems to fall on
deaf ears.
1. Building the Fortress in Google Spain v. AEPD
Member States have also taken different approaches as to how they
intend to treat the nexus between personal data and freedom of expression. This
is particularly relevant in light of the Google Spain v. AEPD47 ruling of the ECJ
in 2014.48 In 2010, the plaintiff, Mario Costeja, requested that Google and La
Vanguardia, a Spanish newspaper, remove his information from their sites
regarding details of a government auction on his home for bankruptcy.49 While
the ultimate question in the case was whether an individual had the well-known
right to be forgotten, the decision implicated freedom of information and
expression since a news source was involved.50 The rights to freedom of
information and expression are protected in Article 10 of the European
Convention on Human Rights but are subject to restrictions that are "in
accordance with law" and "necessary in a democratic society."5 1
The right to erasure was upheld in the Google Spain decision despite the
Advocate General's ("AG") opinion that this right created a tension with the
more established right to freedom of expression."
47 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
4 Id
49 Ignacio N. Cofone, Google v. Spain: A Right to be Forgotten?, 15 CHI-KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 3 (2015).
s Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espatola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 80 (May 13, 2014).
51 EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 10(2),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ConventionENG.pdf. The same article also provides that
such freedom also carries with it a responsibility to "[prevent] disclosure of information received
in confidence" and that it may be restricted to protect the reputation or rights of others. Id
52 Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen ¶ 2, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafola de
Protecci6n de Datos, ECLI:EU:C:2013:424 (June 25, 2013).
The particularly complex and difficult constellation of fundamental rights that
this case presents prevents justification for reinforcing the data subjects' legal
position under the Directive, and imbuing it with a right to be forgotten. This
would entail sacrificing pivotal rights such as freedom of expression and
information. I would also discourage the Court from concluding that these
conflicting interests could satisfactorily be balanced in individual cases on a
case-by-case basis, with the judgment to be left to the Internet search engine
service provider. Such ""'notice and take down procedures"'," if required by
the Court, are likely either to lead to the automatic withdrawal of links to any
objected contents or to an unmanageable number of requests handled by the
71
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In this case, the court interpreted the relevant parameters aiming to give
the widest possible protection to the rights to privacy and data protection. The
litigation had its root in a Spanish proceeding, in which the domestic authority
for the data protection ordered Google to remove some information from the
results of the queries of the search engine.3 Specifically, the removal concerned
the links that resulted from the use of the plaintiff's name as a keyword. Indeed,
the applicant appealed for removing from the Google results a piece of news
published by a legal bulletin relating to a proceeding implicating him in
something that happened many years before. Against this background, the
American search engine rejected the request pointing out that a U.S.-based
company was not subject to EU law and, therefore, to the Spanish law applying
the data protection directive.
This was the first clash between the U.S. legal paradigm and the
European one. The point of view expressed by Google was based on the balance
of fundamental rights. Indeed, according to the U.S.-based search engine, an
injunction like the one proposed under the Spanish law would have most likely
restricted the freedom of expression of the website owners. This argument was
founded both on the idea that search engines enjoy an autonomous right to free
speech, but also that they are subject to a different approach in the protection of
data in the U.S. legal regime.
The core of the case was-as stressed by Advocate General Jaaskinen-
the possible application of the individual's right to be forgotten against the
Internet search engine service providers.54 Taking into consideration the
balancing process developed by ECJ judges, it can be stressed that the court
claimed the existence of the right to be forgotten by providing it with some
(maybe improper) legal basis. The court, in the balancing process, has sacrificed
the freedom of information, contradicting the Jaaskinen opinion that ranked the
freedom of expression as a "primary right[]." 55 In doing that, the ECJ denied the
right to free speech of search engines or web owners,56 but above all, it has
determined that a U.S.-based company is subject to EU law if it is operating in
the EU. In this sense, it could be underlined how the court's data protection-
most popular and important Internet search engine service providers. In this
context it is necessary to recall that "notice and take down procedures" that
appear in the ecommerce Directive 2000/31 relate to unlawful content, but in
the context of the case at hand we are faced with a request for suppressing
legitimate and legal information that has entered the public sphere.
Id
5 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317 (May 13, 2014).
54 Id.
ss Id.
56 One of the most evident anomalies in the reasoning of the Court is the lack of mention of
Article 11 and Article 16 of the Charter, which respectively protect freedom of expression and
freedom to conduct business.
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oriented approach has led to a sort of chronological switch in the interpretation
and reasoning concerning Article 7 and Article 8 of the Charter. The Articles of
the Charter, enshrined at the beginning of 2000, were used to implement a
precedential secondary law. In this perspective, the relevance of Articles 7 and 8
cannot be ignored as it has led and inspired the court in considering Google as a
controller. Following from Google Spain, the court in L 'Oreal SA v. eBay
International57 claimed:
It follows from the foregoing that the answer to Question 1(a) is
that Article 4(1)(a) of Directive 95/46 is to be interpreted as
meaning that processing of personal data is carried out in the
context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on
the territory of a Member State, within the meaning of that
provision, when the operator of a search engine sets up in a
Member State a branch or subsidiary which is intended to
promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine and
which orientates its activity towards the inhabitants of that
Member State. 58
In this case, it is evident how the extreme degree of protection granted
to personal data on the Internet under Articles 7 and 8 involved the risk of an
excess of Europeanization of Internet regulation, which contains two main
issues. The first deals with the "physical" place where data is stored, and it is
strictly linked to the problem of determining the applicable law on the Internet.
The second concerns the attitude to apply EU law and the European paradigm of
the right to data protection every time it comes to an individual resident of the
EU.
Focusing on the first aspect, it can be stressed that this point has been
anticipated in the Digital Rights Ireland decision in which the Court of Justice
affirmed:
[The] directive does not require the data in question to be
retained within the European Union ... it cannot be held that the
control, explicitly required by Article 8, paragraph 3 of the
Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the
requirements of protection and security . .. is fully ensured. 59
From this perspective, Google Spain has been a further step toward the
Europeanization of the protection of data on the Internet, consolidating the
protection and field of application of EU law.
57 Case C-324/09, L'Ordal SA v. eBay Int'l AG, ECLI:EU:C:2010:757, ¶ 63 (Dec. 9, 2010).
58 Id
59 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rts. Ir. Ltd. v. Minister for Comrnc'ns,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, ¶ 68 (Apr. 8, 2014).
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From the second point of view, in Google Spain, the ECJ considered the
EU law applicable when the data of an EU resident are affected, regardless of
where the servers processing the personal data are located. This is due to the
large interpretation given to the expression "context of the activities" of an
establishment, which allows the ECJ to apply a criterion very similar to the
current GDPR Article 3(2) ("Territorial scope"). In this way, the court has
created an ante litteram extraterritorial protection of the European right to data
protection on the Internet.
Google Spain was the first complete attempt to build a fortress for the
protection of personal data of individuals residing in Europe. This fortress was
founded on two pillars: the European law and the EU "territory." The digital
territory seems to be the most critical point of this reconstruction; the
transnational nature of the Internet appears to be irreconcilable with the attempts
of regionalization of the protection of data in the online environment.
The Google Spain judgment seemed inconsistent with various Member
States' rules on personal data and freedom of expression. Ireland and France, for
instance, both explicitly exempted GDPR application in instances where
personal data was processed for "journalistic purposes."
60 This would
presumably mean that the Google Spain decision becomes obsolete should
another instance arise wherein an individual's personal information becomes
implicated through dissemination by a news source.
Semantics become important for implementation in such areas, and
ambiguous language can leave unanswered questions related to how personal
data will be treated against an interest in freedom of expression. For instance,
while the Irish and French rules lend immunity to news sources, Belgium's rules
only declare "a large number of GDPR provisions [as] inapplicable or
conditionally applicable to processing for journalistic purposes."
6' The language
of the Belgian rule would therefore seemingly uphold the right to erasure in only
certain instances that implicate freedom of expression, but not others.
Additionally, the Belgian method of implementation does not answer the
question of how it would identify instances where the right to erasure is to be
upheld.
60 Loi 2018-493 du 20 juin 2018 [Law 2018-493 of June 20, 2018 on Information Technology,
Data Files and Civil Liberites] (Fr.); Irish Data Protection Act (Act No.7/2018), § 43(1),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/7/enacted/en/pdf.
61 Belgium, GDPR Tracker, BIRD & BIRD, https://www.twobirds.com/en/in-focus/general-
data-protection-regulation/gdpr-tracker/belgium (last visited Sept. 6, 2020); Loi dui 5 septembre
le comite instituant le comit6 de securit6 de l'information et modifiant devierseslois concemant la
mise en euvre du Reglement (UE) 2016/679 du Parlement europeen et du Conseil du 27 avirl 2015
[Law of Sept. 5, 2018 establishing the Information Security Committee and amending its laws
concering the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliment and of the
Council 27 April 2015], Moniteur Belge [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium] (Sept. 10, 2018).
[Vol. 12374
2020] THE BALKANIZA TION OF DATA PRIVACYREGULATION
2. Judicial Pragmatism in Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner
The second important step in what someone can consider as a sort of EU
imperialism is Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner"".62 In this very
famous decision, the court invalided the so-called safe harbor agreement, forcing
the EU and the U.S. to renegotiate the conditions for an effective protection of
personal data. Looking at the decision of the court, it can be underlined that
following the manipulative approach adopted in the Digital Rights Ireland and
Google Spain judgments, the EJC tried to extend up to the hilt of the protection
of online data. The premise of this action is the nature of the fundamental right
to data protection and the right to privacy.63
In this sense, the ECJ has analyzed and reviewed the consistency of the
conditions of the Decision 2000/520 with the "adequate" level of protection for
personal data to be transferred to third countries required by Article 25 of the
Data Protection Directive. Thus, the EJC has reviewed if the U.S. legal system
and the safe harbor principles guaranteed "an adequate level of protection" of the
personal data of European residents. In doing this review, the Court applied a
fundamental rights-based assessment looking at Article 7 and Article 8 of the
Charter. In this sense, the Court has developed a sort of standard requiring
equivalence in protecting personal data between the compared legal orders.
Therefore, the ECJ extended the territorial coverage of the fundamental right to
data protection by requiring a geographical extension of the guarantees provided
for by EU law:
The word "adequate" in Article 25(6) of Directive 95/46
admittedly signifies that a third country cannot be required to
ensure a level of protection identical to that guaranteed in the
EU legal order. However, as the Advocate General has observed
in point 141 of his Opinion, the term "'adequate level of
protection"' must be understood as requiring the third country
in fact to ensure, by reason of its domestic law or its international
commitments, a level of protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within
the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46 read in the light
of the Charter. If there were no such requirement, the objective
referred to in the previous paragraph of the present judgment
would be disregarded. Furthermore, the high level of protection
guaranteed by Directive 95/46 read in the light of the Charter
could easily be circumvented by transfers of personal data from
62 Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650 (Oct. 6, 2015).
63 Id. ¶ 38.
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the European Union to third countries for the purpose of being
processed in those countries.64
In conclusion, as stressed in Google Spain, the Charter, specifically
Articles 7 and 8, becomes the trump card to make the protection required by EU
law stronger and to extend the "territorial scope" of EU law in the online
environment. This happens through a manipulation of the EU law, in this case,
the parameter of "adequacy" of Article 25 of Directive 95/46. Additionally, the
standard of adequacy shall not be seen only from a geographical point of view,
but also over time.65
Thus, Schrems was another step toward a Europeanization of online data
protection. Even though the court conceded that third party countries can develop
their own solutions to grant "the adequate level of protection,"
66 this assumption
has not led the court to adopt a self-restraint approach. Indeed, in reviewing if an
adequate protection is actually met in the U.S. legal system, the ECJ has analyzed
the actual and current legal tools in force in the U.S. and their consistency with
the EU law. In doing that, the court has shown a pragmatic view, quite
uncommon in the judicial review of fundamental rights. From this perspective,
the absence of a fully recognized protection of data protection in the U.S. system
has probably influenced the approach of the Court.
III. BEYOND EU CONVERGENCE
A. Decentralized Regulation
Although the GDPR is crafted from an EU-wide consensus on data
privacy standards, each Member State is also given the opportunity to tailor the
implementation process to its own preference.6 7 The language of the GDPR
allows for deviations by including the terms "may" and "shall" in certain
provisions, such as those pertaining to national security and crime prevention.
68
While the permission of exceptions is important in maintaining the sovereignty
of each EU Member State, such exceptions are also the root cause of variations
in enforcement of the GDPR.
" Id.¶73.
65 This approach reflects the influence of the Advocate General's opinion, particularly at
¶ 146-48. Id.
66 Id.¶6.
67 See GDPR, supra note 1.
68 Id. art. 6(1); see also, e.g., id § 45 ("This Regulation does not require a specific law for each
individual processing. A law as a basis for several processing operations based on a legal obligation
to which the controller is subject or where processing is necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of an official authority may be sufficient. It
should also be for Union or Member State law to determine the purpose of processing.").
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1. The Commission's Role
The GDPR's allowance of deviations is a result of the Commission's
role. Indeed, beyond the framework of data protection, in recent years, the
Commission adopted not only hard regulation like the GDPR, but it has also
relied on different co-regulatory and self-regulatory measures to address the
challenges coming from new technologies and, more generally, the digital
environment. This is evident when focusing on the set of High-Level Expert
Groups ("HLEG") and codes of conduct and practices, especially those on hate
speech online and disinformation. For instance, in April 2018, the Commission
published its Communication on Disinformation,69 promoting a "European
approach" to tackle the phenomenon. The Commission's communication came
from the work of the HLEG set up in January 2018 to develop the EU strategy
for fighting disinformation. The HLEG laid out the groundwork by investigating
possible lines of action,70 providing the design of general and specific objectives
to tackle forms of online speech which are not illegal in themselves, but that may
nevertheless prove harmful for citizens and society at large. According to the
European constitutional commitment to the protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms, as enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and broadly
fashioned along the long standing constitutional paradigm of the ECHR, the
HLEG's report assumed that any intervention to fight disinformation should not
impair or interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms at stake, chiefly,
freedom of expression, freedom of the press and pluralistic values. Accordingly,
the response to the multi-faceted nature of disinformation practices was the
design of a "multidimensional approach" in order to adequately frame the
complexity of the phenomenon, as well as to consider the diverse range of
stakeholders involved.
Even in the field of hard regulation, this fragmentation can also be found
in other legal measures.7 1 For instance, the adoption of the Copyright Directive
left broad margins of discretion to Member States in implementing its rules.72 In
particular, this choice introduces crucial issues, including issues concerning the
exemption of liability of online platforms and the introduction of new safeguards
regarding the platforms' processing of content according to Article 17. Likewise,
69 EUR. COMM'N, Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach, EUR-LEx (Apr. 26,
2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0236.
70 EUR. COMM'N, A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO DISINFORMATION, REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT HIGH LEVEL GROUP ON FAKE NEWS AND ONLINE DISINFORMATION (2018).
Oreste Pollicino & Giovanni De Gregorio, A Constitutional Change of Heart: ISP Liability
and Artificial Intelligence in the Digital Single Market, 18 GLOB. CMTY. Y.B. OF INT'L L. & JURIS.
237, 265-66 (2019).
72 Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April, 2019
on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending Directives 96/9/EC
and 2001/29/EC, ¶ 30-33, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92.
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the amendments to the Audio-Visual Media Service Directive reveals a similar
pattern.73 In this case, the framework is even more nuanced since the obligations
introduced to video-sharing platforms are, in some cases, left to co-regulation,
delegating competent authorities in Member States to adopt rules in sensitive
fields like the safeguards to ensure the protection of minors and EU citizens from
harmful content.74
Therefore, the GDPR is only the result of this framework. The broad
margins of discretion or the lack of a normative language are the result of a
common trend in the field of law and technology in the EU. Nevertheless, the
degree of harmonization of data protection law in the EU increased thanks to the
GDPR. Even if it is true that open clauses could undermine the goal of
harmonization, the move from a Directive to a Regulation cannot be disregarded,
not only from a formal standpoint, but also a substantive standpoint.
2. Conforming with the GDPR: Differentiated Approach in
Germany and Italy
The German Data Protection Amendment Act ("GDPAA"), which
updates Germany's previous data law to conform with the GDPR, takes liberties
with the GDPR's flexible language in Article 9(2) regarding the use of "special
categories of personal data."75 The use of personal data is strictly prohibited if
being used to "uniquely [identify] a natural person""; however, exceptions to this
rule are allowed when necessary to carry out obligations and rights of the
controller or to protect vital interests of the data subject.
76 The GDPAA makes
use of these exceptions and allows the use of personal data for uses such as
preventive medicine, employee capacity assessments, and medical diagnosis.
7 7
Contrastingly, instead of creating a single rule regarding personal data,
Italy's Legislative Decree note 101/2018 gives the "Garante" the responsibility
of issuing provisions on safeguard measures for personal data every two years.
78
73 Directive (EU) 2018/1808 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November,
2018 Amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Provision of
Audiovisual Media Services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive) in View of Changing Market
Realities, ¶48, 2018 O.J. (L 303) 69.
?4 Id.
75 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (explaining that personal data includes health, biometrics,
ideological, sexual, and genetic data).
76 Id. art. 9(2)
77 Lennart SchuBler & Natallia Karniyevich, Germany Is the First EU Member State To Enact




78 Rocco Panetta, Analysis: Italy's GDPR Implementation Law, PRIv. TRACKER,
https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-italys-gdpr-implementation-law/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
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The benefits and drawbacks of the differences between the German and
Italian methods of safeguarding personal health data will likely become apparent
over time. Germany's standardization of its treatment may be beneficial in that
it could be easier for consumers to understand and will not vary every few years.
Whereas in Italy's case, the treatment of personal data will be updated every two
years which could lead to confusion over how individuals' data is being treated
with each determination issued by the Garante, while at the same time ensuring
that laws will be more reactive to debates on data privacy and therefore more
protective of individuals' data.79
3. Differentiated Enforcement
The differentiated enforcement of the GDPR leads to a variety of data
privacy regimes in the EU. France is among the group of EU Member States that
have decided to adopt a single bill for the implementation and adaptation of the
GDPR and the Police Directive.80 The New Personal Data Protection Act
("NDPA") implements the GDPR by creating new rights for the data subject,
amends the current Loi No. 78-17 du 20 Juin 2018 governing personal data
protection, and gives stronger enforcement mechanisms to La Commission
Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertds ("CNIL")-the French Data
Protection Authority.8' In conformity with the GDPR, the CNIL has the power
to create guidelines and standards for data protection and is given strengthened
investigation powers with regards to data centers and data controllers, which
allows the CNIL to increase administrative fines and introduces penalties for
obstructing the CNIL's operations.82
While the CNIL is being afforded greater liberties in enforcing the
GDPR and protecting personal data, the Irish Office of the Data Protection
Commissioner ("IDPC") is taking a more relaxed approach to GDPR
compliance. Where the CNIL is given increased inspection powers with regard
to data-retention centers, be it in data controller locations or elsewhere, the IDPC
prefers negotiation to on-site inspections.83 This is particularly troubling because
a majority of the big tech companies that are governed by the GDPR are
headquartered in Ireland, attracted by the more lenient regulations and tax
79 Italy: Data Protection Law Integrating the GDPR in Place, DLA PIPER (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://blogs.dlapiper.com/privacymatters/italy-data-protection-law-integrating-the-gdpr-in-
place/.
80 Transposition of the Directive (EU) 2016/680, EUR. UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid
=12946 (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
81 NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS OF THE GDPR 52 (Karen McCullagh et al. eds., 2019).
8 Id. at 54-55.
83 Nicolas Vinocur, How One Country Blocks the World on Data Privacy, POLITICO (Apr. 29,
2019, 3:45 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/04/24/ireland-data-privacy-1270123.
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incentives.84 Not only does this risk competition among EU Member States to
have big tech companies headquartered within their jurisdiction, but it also
allows those companies to escape stringent applications of the GDPR.
Furthermore, Ireland has only recently announced that it intends to initiate a
probe against Google for its data privacy practices related to online advertising.85
2018 saw implementation of the GDPR by EU Member States, and 2019
saw states initiating its enforcement. Member States are required to implement
national penalties for breaches of the GDPR.
86 Where Ireland has only begun to
explore penalties for violators of the GDPR, other states have instituted
administrative penalties such as fines for breaches, and some have even gone so
far as to create criminal offenses.87 For instance, Spain's enforcement provisions
are purely administrative at this stage.88 Depending on the type of violation,
maximum fines can range anywhere from E30,000 to millions of euros.
89 Spain
penalizes the sending of marketing communications in breach of the GDPR with
a maximum fine of 150,000 and penalizes breaches of applicable cookie
restrictions with a fine of up to 30,000.
90 For repeat offenders who fail to
comply with cookie restrictions, fines can reach up to E150,000 if a second
violation is repeated "within three years after the first final decision of the
Spanish Data Protection Agency"91 Data security breaches induce even more
expensive penalties, demanding administrative fines up to E10 million or
alternatively, 2% of worldwide turnover from the previous financial year,
applying the higher penalty.
92
84 Edward Elmore, Google Says It Will no Longer Use "Double Irish, Dutch Sandwich" Tax
Loophole, GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2020, 3:49 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2020/jan/01 /google-says-it-will-no-longer-use-double-irish-dutch-sandwich-tax-loophole.
85 Ryan Browne, EU Regulator Launches Probe into Google over Data Privacy, CNBC (May
22, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/22/irish-data-privacy-watchdog-to-probe-
google-over-potential-gdpr-breach.html.
86 Joanne Vengadesan & Katie Gordon, United with Differences: Key GDPR Derogations
Across Europe, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 26, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9a9a3022-86bc-45
8e-be3 -Occ2 4 367 a9 18.
87 Id
88 Id.
89 Ruth Benito Martin & Alberto L6pez Cazalilla, Spain: Data Protection Laws and
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In June 2019, the Spanish Data Protection Agency enforced its GDPR
compliance provisions against the Spanish professional soccer league, La Liga.93
The league was fined E250,000 after being found guilty of abusing the
transparency principles of the GDPR by using an app to remotely activate the
microphone in a user's mobile device and listen in on them.94 This was done to
determine whether Spanish bars were showing football matches without paying
the appropriate fees to stream them.95 While the app did provide a warning to
users that their personal data would be collected, the Spanish Data Protection
Agency found it to be obscure.96 Additionally, since the Agency viewed La
Liga's use of the app as a method of personal data collection, it concluded that
La Liga needed not only to explicitly notify the users that their data was being
collected in such a way, but needed to do so every time that data collection
occurred.97
La Liga has since argued that the fine is nothing more than a
demonstration by the Spanish Data Protection Agency intended to exemplify its
interpretation of the GDPR.98 It also argues that the Agency's requirement that
La Liga use a microphone icon to indicate its recording practices was not a
foreseeable implication of the GDPR.99 Considering that the same argument
caused the Spanish National Court to rescind a fine of E150,000 which had been
applied to Google, La Liga's argument may have some merit.100 It is also
noteworthy that the fine applied to La Liga for its personal data abuse is only a
fraction of the GDPR's maximum penalty for these kinds of breaches, which can
reach up to E20 billion or 4% of turnover.0 1 Though this differs slightly from the
Spanish limit of E 10 billion or 2% turnover, the Spanish DPA will sometimes
also apply the GDPR administrative fine if an infringement simultaneously
9 Juan Luis Sanchez & Carlos del Castillo, The Data Protection Agency Fined LaLiga
250,000 Euros for the App that Uses the Microphone of Mobile Phones To Hunt Down Bars,
ELDIARIO (June 11, 2019, 12:43 PM), https://www.eldiario.es/tecnologia/Agencia-Proteccion-
Datos-Liga-microfono_0_908859408.html.
94 Steve McCaskill, La Liga Handed $280,000 GDPR Fine For "Spying" on Fans Watching
Pirated Streams, FORBES (June 12, 2019, 9:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemccaskill/2019/06/12/la-liga-handed-e250000-gdpr-fine-for-
spying-on-fans-watching-pirated-streams/#5b58602f75d9.





100 Carlos del Castillo, The National Court Annuls the Fine of 150,000 Euros to Google for
Notifying the Right To Be Forgotten to the Media, ELDIARiO (May 27, 2019, 11:57 AM),
https://www.eldiario.es/tecnologia/Audiencia-Nacional-Proteccion-Datos-
Google_0_903610208.html.
101 McCaskill, supra note 94.
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violates both the Spanish Law 34/2002 on information society services and
ecommerce and the GDPR.102
The new German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), effective as of
May 25, 2018, imposes imprisonment as a penalty for certain data protection
infringements.103 Instances where an individual's personal data is illegally
transferred, made available on a large scale for commercial purposes, or
fraudulently obtained for the purpose of enrichment can carry a penalty of up to
three 'years imprisonment or a fine.1 04 Thus far, Germany has been a leader in
GDPR enforcement, being one of the first to begin compliance audits in July
2018.105 As of early 2019, Germany has issued 41 fines for non-compliance with
the GDPR.106 The highest of these fines has been £80,000, issued to a business
that allowed individuals' health data to be viewed by the public.1
0 7 Even the
highest penalty issued by the German Data Protection Authority so far is not
remotely comparable to the giant £50 million fine issued by the CNIL against
Google.108 However, beyond an acknowledgment of a data breach against Airbus
SE,10 9 and a E400,000 fine against the real estate company Sergic, 10 it seems that
France has been comparatively less thorough than Germany in enforcing GDPR
compliance. While French penalties have been more expensive for non-
compliant companies, German penalties have been more comprehensive. This
would seem to solidify Germany's status as leader in GDPR compliance, which
102 Martin & Cazalilla, supra note 89.
103 Heinrich Amadeus Wolff, The Implementation of Administrative Fines Under the General
Data Protection Regulation from the German Perspective, 2 INT'L J. DATA PROT. OFFICER, PRIV.
OFFICER & PRIV. COUNS. 11, 13 (2018).
104 Id. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], June 30, 2017, BGBI
I at 2097, last amended by Gesetz [G], Nov. 20, 2019, BGBI I at 1626, art. 12 (Ger.),
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch bdsg/englischbdsg.html#p0
338 .
105 Susy Mendoza, GDPR Compliance-It Takes a Village, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1155
(2019); Focal Point Insights, Get Ready: Germany's DPA's Are Starting Their GDPR Audits,
FOCAL POINT DATA RISK (Oct. 17, 2018), https://blog.focal-point.com/get-ready-germanys-dpas-
are-starting-their-gdpr-audits.
106 Georgina Graham & Ashley Hurst, GDPR Enforcement: How Are EU Regulators Flexing
Their Muscles?, IQ: THE RIM Q., Aug. 2019, at 20, 23.




108 The CNIL's Restricted Committee Imposes a Financial Penalty of 50 Million Euros Against
GOOGLE L.L.C., CNIL (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/en/cnils-restricted-committee-
imposes-financial-penalty-50-million-euros-against-google-llc.
109 Benjamin D. Katz, Airbus Hit by Cyber Breach. Says Aircraft Production Unaffected,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2 019-01-30/airbus-hit-
by-cyber-breach-says-aircraft-production-unaffected.
10 SERGIC: Sanction de 400,000E pour Atteinte a la Sicurite des Donnees et Non-respect des
Durdes de Conservation, CNIL (June 6, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/fr/sergic-sanction-de-400-
000eu-pour-atteinte-la-securite-des-donnees-et-non-respect-des-durees-de.
[Vol. 12382
2020] THE BALKANIZATION OF DATA PRIVACYREGULATION
could indicate that other Member States may choose to follow in its footsteps-
potentially implementing criminal provisions for non-compliance down the road.
B. The Polarity of the Territorial Scope in the ECJ Jurisprudence
Two decisions seem to have recently reversed the polarity of the
territorial scope of the EU law: Google L.L. C. v. Commission Nationale de
l'Informatique et des Libertds ("CNIL")" and Glawischnig-Piesczek v.
Facebook Ireland Ltd.1 2 Even if only one of these two decisions is strictly linked
to the right to data protection, the two judgments shall be analyzed together
because they seem to inaugurate a new trend in the approach to territorial scope
of the EU law. If, on the one hand, Google L.L.C. 'seems to have stopped the
progression of the territorial application of the EU law in the field of digital
privacy, then Glawischnig-Piesczek seems to have opened the door to an
eventual expansion of the EU balance between fundamental rights in the field of
freedom of expression. This last field of action-even if this is not a harmonized
matter under EU treaties-could be the new challenge for the coexistence. of
different digital sovereignties on the Internet.
1. Google L.L.C. v. Commission Nationale de 1'Informatique et
des Libertds ("CNIL ")
In Google v. CNIL, the ECJ attempted to mitigate the most problematic
systemic implications descendant from its ruling in Google Spain, limiting to the
territory of Europe both the consequences of the "super" right to privacy, as
formulated by Google Spain, and the range of application of EU law. The core
of the decision is the nature of the right to be forgotten and its territorial scope:
the single member state, the EU territory, or the whole world. From this point of
view, two diametrically opposed solutions were proposed. The Google Advisory
Council opted for a limitation of the right to be forgotten to the EU territory
only,113 while Working Party Article 29 proposed a global application of that
right, not limiting it to European domains (e.g. ".es," ".eu," etc.)."4
"1 Case C-507/17, Google L.L.C. v. Comm'n Nationale de I'Informatique et des Libertes
(CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772 (Sept. 24, 2019).
112 Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821 (Oct.
3, 2019).
"3 The Advisory Council to Google on the Right To Be Forgotten (Feb. 6, 2015),
https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/archive.google.com/it//advisorycouncil/advisement/a
dvisory-report.pdf.
"4 Guidelines on the Implementation of the Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment
on "Google Spain and Inc v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja
Gonzalez" C-131/12, EUR. COMM'N (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfn?item id=667236.
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Starting from the conclusions of AG Macieji Szpunar, it has to be
emphasized that a self-restraint approach is proposed, just as in the decision
Glawischnig-Piesczek. AG Szpunar claimed that neither the EU law nor the ECJ
case law faced the specific issue of the territoriality of the de-referencing in the
protection of the rights of Articles 7 and 8,15 rectius neither the EU rule-maker
nor the EU judges dealt with the issue of how to treat and consider researchers
infringing the right to be forgotten made out of the EU physical borders.
As a consequence, the main question was
[i]f the provisions of Directive 95/46 are thus intended to protect
the fundamental rights, on the basis of Articles 7 and 8 of the
Charter, of the person "searched" and subsequently
"referenced," they are silent, however, on the question of the
territoriality of the de-referencing. By way of example, neither
those provisions nor the judgment in Google Spain v. AEPD and
Google make clear whether a search request made from
Singapore must be treated differently from a search request
made from Paris or from Katowice. 116
The core of the AG's argument focused on the main reason behind the
"digital imperialism" of the EU law and the ECJ jurisprudence with respect to
the protection of fundamental rights online. From this point of view, admitting
that in some fields it is possibly an extraterritorial effect, the AG's conclusions
excluded the possibility of an expansion of the territorial scope of fundamental
rights beyond the EU borders, both rejecting the argument of the extraterritorial
effects of ECHR and excluding the nature of the super right not subjected to any
balancing process of the right to be forgotten. Above all, this second element
appears relevant, since the balance between fundamental rights is a territorial-
based constitutional issue:
If worldwide de-referencing were admitted, the EU authorities
would not be in a position to define and determine a right to
receive information, still less to strike a balance between that
right and the other fundamental rights to data protection and to
private life, a fortiori because such a public interest in having
access to information will necessarily vary, depending on its
geographic location, from one third State to another.
1 7
The point raised by the AG concerns not only the problem of the
"invasion" of other countries' sovereignty in designating their own balance
115 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Case C-507/17, Google L.L.C. v. Comm'n
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between fundamental rights, but also the increasing risk to determine a
counteraction:
If an authority within the European Union could order de-
referencing on a worldwide scale, an inevitable signal would be
sent to third countries, which could also order de-referencing
under their own laws. Let us suppose that, for whatever reason,
third countries interpret certain of their rights in such a way as
to prevent persons located in a Member State of the European
Union from having access to information which they sought.
There would be a genuine risk of a race to the bottom, to the
detriment of freedom of expression, on a European and
worldwide scale.' 8
In conclusion, the proposal of the AG is that of the "'geo-'blocking"
technology applied to the EU territory.
Against this background, the court, which once reaffirmed the
application of the EU law at the activities of search engines and observed that
the CNIL had refused the proposal of a "geo-blocking" application as formulated
by Google, analyzed the questions proposed for a preliminary ruling: whether,
according to Articles 12(b) and 14 of Directive 95/46 and Article 17(1) of
Regulation 2016/679, the de-referencing is due on all the versions of the search
engine, only on the versions of that search engine corresponding to all the
Member States, or even only on the version corresponding to the Member State
where the de-referencing has been required.
The global nature of the Internet-a global network without borders-
and the claims of the right to digital privacy and data protection seemed to open
the door to a new chapter of the extra-territoriality saga:
Such considerations are such as to justify the existence of a
competence on the part of the EU legislature to lay down the
obligation, for a search engine operator, to carry out, when
granting a request for de-referencing made by such a person, a
de-referencing on all the versions of its search engine.19
However, the court-embracing the 'AG's opinion-highlights the
different approach to the right to data protection and digital privacy in the
different legal systems and the uncertain nature of this right. Two of the pillars
at the foundation of the extraterritoriality effect seem to fall: on the one hand, it
is recognized that there is the limited digital sovereignty of the EU law-or
better, it is recognized that even in the digital, there are different sovereignties-
and on the other hand, the trump card of the absolute right to data protection and
118 Id.¶61.
119 Case C-507/17, Google L.L.C. v. Comm'n Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libert6s
(CNIL), ECLI:EU:C:2019:772, ¶ 58 (Sept. 24, 2019).
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privacy online seems to be partially declined. As a consequence, even if the best
solution for the ECJ would have been the global one, the court opted for self-
restraint, motivated by the risk of a sort of European legal colonization led in the
name of the cultural hegemony.
However, this decision seems more a tactical retreat than a surrender to
the criticism against the Europeanization of the Internet regulation; it appears to
be a self-restraint approach of the Judicial power waiting for the decision of the
political one. The court has indeed affirmed
[w]hile the EU legislature has, in Article 17(3)(a) of Regulation
2016/679, struck a balance between that right and that freedom
so far as the Union is concerned (see, to that effect, today's
judgment, GC and Others (De-referencing of sensitive data), C-
136/17, paragraph 59), it must be found that, by contrast, it has
not, to date, struck such a balance as regards the scope of a de-
referencing outside the Union.
120
Aside from these considerations, the obligation to remove contents
infringing the right to privacy seems to be restricted to the EU Member States.'
2 1
A certain "margin of appreciation" seems to be left to national authorities in
demanding a global removal.
2. Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd.
The second decision, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook, does not
concern data protection and instead analyzes a disharmonized field.122 However,
120 Id.¶ 61.
121 Id. ¶66.
[T]he EU legislature has now chosen to lay down the rules concerning data
protection by way of a regulation, which is directly applicable in all the
Member States, which has been done, as is emphasised by recital 10 of
Regulation 2016/679, in order to ensure a consistent and high level of
protection throughout the European Union and to remove the obstacles to
flows of personal data within the Union, that the de-referencing in question is,
in principle, supposed to be carried out in respect of all the Member States.
Id.
122 As stressed by the same AG,
The situation at issue in the main proceedings is, prima facie, different from
that which constituted the starting point of my analysis concerning the
territorial scope of a de-referencing of the results of a search engine in Google
(Territorial scope of de-referencing), cited by Facebook Ireland and the
Latvian Government. That case concerns Directive 95/46/EC, which
harmonises, at Union level, certain material rules on data protection. It was,
notably, the fact that the applicable material rules are harmonised that led me
to conclude that a service provider had to be required to delete the results
displayed following a search carried out not only from a single Member State
but from a place within the European Union. However, in my Opinion in that
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it is still quite useful to individuate a trend in the Europeanization of the territorial
scope of EU law.
The EU has intervened in the free-speech field,123 even if this matter is
not fully harmonized because different balancing processes exist in Member
States concerning the limits of freedom of expression. The willingness of EU
institutions to create a droit acquis communautaire in the free speech field could
stem from various factors that cannot be analyzed in this paper (e.g., helping the
political integration of the EU, answering to the populist challenges, facing the
crisis of European values and the rising of fair right parties and illiberal
democracies, and fighting the foreign propaganda and influences). In this sense,
EU action in the free speech field consists of two soft law tools: the Code of
Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online,12 ' aimed at censuring hate
speech on Internet platforms, and the Code of Practice on disinformation, which
enshrined the first attempt to regulate the giants of the web in the field of
disinformation and misinformation.125 Both the initiatives follow a broad work
of expert groups, European Parliament resolutions, and even Member States'
domestic legislation.
In this framework, it shall be stressed that as in the matter of digital
privacy, the European balance of fundamental rights is quite different from the
U.S. one.12 6 As a consequence, another clash of digital sovereignties could
case I did not exclude the possibility that there might be situations in which
the interest of the Union requires the application of the provisions of that
directive beyond the territory of the European Union.
Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland
Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 79 (June 4, 2019).
123 See, e.g., Directive 2011/93/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December, 2011 on Combating the Sexual Abuse and Sexual Exploitation of Children and Child
Pornography and Replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA, 2011 O.J. (L 335) 1-14;
Directive 2017/541, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March, 2017 on
combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA, 2017 O.J. (L 88) 6-21 (EU); Commission Recommendation
2018/334 of 1 March, 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online C/2018/1177,
2018 O.J. (L 63) 50-61 (EU); Commission Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament
and of the Council of 9 December, 2018 on Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content
Online, COM (2018) 640 final.
124 The EU Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online, EUR. COMM'N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-
discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-code-conduct-countering-illegal-hate-speech-
online-en (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
125 Code of Practice on Disinformation, EUR. COMM'N (July 7, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation.
126 If in the U.S. legal system, the doctrine of the marketplace of ideas shall consider state's
intervention in the public discourse as inconsistent with First Amendment, the European scenario
in the ECHR's case law has embraced a different balancing process of the limits of free speech.
Under Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 11 of the Charter of Nice, not all forms of speech enjoy
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deflagrate the Internet and feed the conflict between Internet regulation and the
territorial scope of protection of fundamental rights. In this sense, it shall be
stressed that, as opposed to digital privacy, the free speech matter lacks one of
the two following elements: the super fundamental right or different concepts of
that right. These elements have alimented the digital privacy issue, i.e., the
presence of a super fundamental right, or better, an undisputed balance of
fundamental rights in the matter of free speech. But by looking closer at EU
policies, it is possible to highlight that, founding their legal basis on the ECHR
case law, the Code of Conduct and the Code of Practice are working on this.
These two tools are proposing a very clear idea of what the limits of freedom of
speech should be, even if they are only slightly outlined in Article 11 of the EU
Charter of fundamental rights and in ECJ case law. 127
The decision in Glawischnig-Piesczek deals with the removal of
defamatory content from Facebook under Directive 2000/31. The two main
issues of the decision were the type of contents that can be removed and the range
of application of EU law. In this Article, the issue of the removal of the identical
allegations and/or "equivalent content" will not be explored under the key of the
privatization of censorship. Instead, this Article will confine the analysis to the
matter of the territorial application of EU law and focusing on the similarities to
the other decisions in terms of territorial scope.
Briefly analyzing the first issue, the court chose not to limit the removal
to identical contents but to allow the removal of equivalent contents, widening
the content-based control over the information spread; this seems to be the first
problematic profile linked to the decision. Allowing the removal of more content
considered equivalent in its nature to the banned ones could increase the chances
that a different balance of rights would have been assumed in a third country
concerning the expression not covered by free speech clauses. For instance, the
clash between the balancing processes is clearly evidenced by comparing the
balance assumed by the Supreme Court of the Unites States in the defamatory
cases12 8 with the Austrian one.
Again, as in Google v. CNIL, the conclusions of AG Szpunar lean toward
a geographically limited application of the national law even in the digital world.
First of all, the problems of other state's digital sovereignty as linked to a general
application of a national law is underlined:
the same regime of protection, and this is particularly evident in the fields of hate speech and fake
news. See Oreste Pollicino & Eletra Bietti, Truth and Deception Across the Atlantic: A Roadmap
of Disinformation in the US and Europe, 11 ITALIAN J. PUB. L. 57 (2019); Frederick Schaurer,
Freedom of Expression Adjudication in Europe and America: A Case Study in Comparative
Constitutional Architecture (Univ. Va. Sch. of L., Working Paper No. RWP05-019, 2005).
127 In this Section, the issue of the legitimation of this EU action, which could be disputed since
this is not a harmonized or EU competence field, shall not be analyzed.
128 For more information about the probatio diabolica of the "actual malice" in the U.S. system,
see Kyu Ho Youm, "Actual Malice" in U.S. Defamation Law: The Minority of One Doctrine in
the World?, 4 J. INT'L ENT. & MEDIA L. 1 (2011).
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[A]s regards defamatory infringements, the imposition in one
Member State of an obligation consisting in removing certain
information worldwide, for all users of an electronic platform,
because of the illegality of that information established under an
applicable law, would have the consequence that the finding of
its illegality would have effects in other States. In other words,
the finding of the illegal nature of the information in question
would extend to the territories of those other States. However, it
is not precluded that, according to the laws designated as
applicable under those States' national conflict rules, that
information might be considered legal.12 9
Highlighting the inharmonious nature of the defamation law and the fact
that no European provisions preclude an order of removal on a global-based
scale, the AG hopes that
in the interest of international comity ... that court should, as
far as possible, limit the extraterritorial effects of its junctions
concerning harm to private life and personality rights. The
implementation of a removal obligation should not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve the protection of the injured person.
Thus, instead of removing the content, that court might, in an
appropriate case, order that access to that information be
disabled with the help of geo-blocking.3 0
Given the above, the court, as in Google v. CNIL, affirmed that no EU
provisions impose a territorial limitation in that field. "However, it is apparent
from recitals 58 and 60 of that directive that, in view of the global dimension of
electronic commerce, the EU legislature considered it necessary to ensure that
EU rules in that area are consistent with the rules applicable at international
level." 131
The decision of the court could be read as a green light to the national
courts to impose a global scope to their decisions regarding the free speech
issue.13 2 Thus, the European Court in Glawischnig-Piesczek has not stopped the
possibility of the extraterritorial effect of the EU Member States' laws. This
approach, which is aimed at leaving an open-door policy regarding the
extraterritorial scope of the EU law, could find new applications in the field of
129 Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook
Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶ 80 (June 4, 2019).
130 ld.1100.
131 Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2019:821, ¶ 51
(Oct. 3, 2019).
32 Pam Cowburn, CJEU Judgment in Facebook Ireland Case Is Threat to Online Free Speech,
ARTICLE19 (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/cjeu-judgment-in-facebook-
ireland-case-is-threat-to-online-free-speech/.
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fake news and hate speech, which are subjected to a high level of attention by
the EU institutions.
It is perhaps possible, due to the growing convergence of the principles
regulating content moderation and data protection,'
3 3 to read this decision in a
broader trend: the Europeanization of Internet regulation, regardless of its
consequence on third countries' sovereignty.
Additionally, it must be stressed that a Sword of Damocles is hanging
over this apparent self-restrained approach of the ECJ: the court seems to leave
room for the political power to decide over the territorial scope of EU law. The
court in these two decisions has not excluded the global territorial application of
EU fundamental rights.
IV. U.S. SECTORAL PRIVACY REGULATION
A. Lack of an Overarching Federal Data Regulation
Data privacy regulation in the U.S. lacks an overarching federal
mechanism by which data privacy is standardized. While states are free to craft
their own privacy laws, the U.S. lacks a GDPR-like federal law to guide the
creation of such state laws. Prompted by the Watergate scandal, the Privacy Act
of 1974 was one of the first privacy tools crafted to manage the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of individuals' personal data obtained by
federal agencies.'34 However, the Privacy Act solely governs the data stored by
federal agencies, not businesses or other entities, which leaves individuals at the
mercy of companies like Facebook and Amazon.' 35 Similarly, the remaining U.S.
privacy regulations are situation-specific, leaving a dearth of legal protection in
the data privacy sphere.
The stipulations of the Privacy Act prevent federal agencies from
disclosing private data to third parties without the consent of the individual in
question, guarantee individuals' rights to access their own data retained by an
agency, and allow requests for an amendment of information.1
36 Civil remedies
are available for alleged breaches of data use by agencies and include causes of
actions such as wrongful denial of access to information retained by agencies,
wrongful disclosure to third parties, and improper maintenance of records in
accordance with requirements of the Privacy Act.1 37 Civil liabilities for data
misuse are also available under the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of
133 Giovanni De Gregorio, The E-Commerce Directive and GDPR: Towards Convergence of
Legal Regimes in the Algorithmic Society? (European Univ. Inst., Working Paper No. RSCAS
2019/36, 2019).
134 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2020).
13 Id
136 Id. § 552a(b); id. § 552a(d)(1)-(2).
'3 Id. § 552a(g)(1); id § 552a(i)(1)-(3).
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1974 ("COPPA").138 COPPA recognizes the special state of childhood; it
requires extra protection and appropriately forbids online service providers from
collecting a child's data in any way that may conflict with regulations
implemented by the FTC.' 39 The Act creates a standard by which businesses are
required to obtain parental consent before collecting private data on minors and
to make their privacy policies easily accessible on their websites.140
The U.S. Congress has seen a few attempts from legislators to introduce
broad federal regulations that would unify privacy standards across the nation. 141
Early 2018 saw the introduction of the Social Media Privacy Protection and
Consumer Rights Act. 42 Though the bill was never passed, it proved to be an
important starting point for federal privacy regulation proposals. 143 Senator Amy
Klobuchar crafted the bill and introduced it just two weeks after Congress
questioned Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg about the Cambridge Analytica
Scandal of 2018, demonstrating that the proposed legislation was clearly a
reactionary measure. '44 Under this proposed Act, online platform operators
would have had the duty to inform users that their data would be collected and
used by both the operator and third parties. 145 Platforms would have also been
required to provide users with a copy of any data that was collected from them
as well as information on how that data is used.'46 Any misuse of consumer data
would need to be disclosed within a period of 72 hours after discovery.147 The
FTC would have been endowed with the responsibility of enforcing the bill under
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Communications Act of 1934.
Following the failure of the Social Media Privacy Protection and
Consumer Rights Act to be passed into law, 15 Democratic senators introduced
the Data Care Act of 2018, which also ultimately failed to pass.148 The Data Care
Act proposed a standard by which companies would have been required to
protect consumer information and promptly notify consumers about data
138 15 U.S.C.A. § 6504(a)(1).
139 Id. § 6502(a).
140 Id. § 6502(b).
141 See, e.g., Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
142 Social Media Privacy Protection and Consumer Rights Act of 2018, S. 2728, 115th Cong.
(2018).
143 Id.
'44 April Glaser, There's a New Bill To Regulate Facebook and Google's Data Collection,
SLATE (Apr. 24, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/04/the-new-bill-to-regulate-facebook-
and-googles-data-might-actually-do-the-trick.html.




148 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
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breaches involving sensitive data, to not use identifying data in a way that would
result in "reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial harm to an
end user," and to ensure the same standard for third-party businesses that were
sold access to user information.149 In comparison to its predecessor, the Data
Care Act would have given the FTC not only the responsibility of enforcing the
bill, but also of imposing civil penalties.150 The bill also went further than Senator
Klobuchar's proposition by specifying the types of data that would be protected,
such as a user's social security number, driver's license number, biometric data,
name, and birth data.151
The failure of the Data Care Act was followed by the introduction of the
American Data Dissemination Act ("ADD Act") by Senator Marco Rubio.'
2 The
ADD Act's most unique feature in comparison to previous attempts at national
privacy legislation was that this Act puts even more pressure on the FTC to be
the overseer of all privacy infractions committed by companies.
153 The proposal
gave the FTC a 180-day window within which to submit "detailed
recommendations for privacy requirements that congress could impose on
covered providers that would be substantially similar . .. to the . .. Privacy Act
of 1974," which currently regulates government data collection.
154 After receipt
of the FTC's recommendations, Congress would be allowed a two-year period
by which it would need to enact privacy requirements for "covered providers"
that are "substantially similar" to the requirements imposed on government
agencies by the Privacy Act.15 5 However, if Congress fails to appropriately
respond within that two-year period, the burden again would fall on the FTC to
enact final regulations that impose privacy requirements in accordance with the
guidelines provided by the bill.' 56
The ADD Act takes note of the GDPR's effects, for instance,
recognizing that the GDPR's provisions have been difficult for small businesses
to implement and exempting them from a newly imposed federal privacy
regulation.5 7 Other general guidelines follow the same pattern as previous bills
by restricting disclosure of consumer information and giving users the right to
access records with their information and the right to request removal of
149 Kris Holt, Senate Democrats Introduce Bill To Protect Your Online Data, ENGADGET (Dec.
12, 2018), https://www.engadget.com/2018-12-12-senate-data-protection-bill-data-care-act.html.
150 Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018).
1s1 Id.
152 American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019).
153 Id.
154 Id. (referring to big business Internet service providers as "covered providers").
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Will Rinehart, Understanding the ADD Act, AM. ACTION F. (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/insight/understanding-the-add-act/.
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information.158 Though the ADD Act takes into consideration the pitfalls of the
GDPR that businesses have experienced, it may still have unforeseen
consequences. Many state regulations'59 make the mistake of focusing on data
collection rather than data use, neglecting the source of harm to consumers,
which is data misuse.160
Not only has federal legislation lacked a comprehensive individual
approach to data privacy regulation for individuals, but most importantly the
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") of 1996 was one of the earliest attempts
in the U.S. to moderate free speech on the Internet by offering a shield from tort
liability to online platforms.16' The potential for end users on Internet service
sites to violate libel or other restricted speech laws raised a question of whether
Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") should be held liable for all of the content on
their sites. 12 Judicial decisions on the issue assessed the responsibility of the
ISPs to remove harmful or libelous content based on their knowledge and control
over that content.'63 In a 1991 case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc.,164 the
Southern District of New York found that an ISP could not be held liable for
content that end users posted to its site if it did not regularly review such content
as a business practice.'65 Lack of knowledge regarding the libelous content
precluded liability for the ISP.'66 However, four years later in Stratton Oakmont,
Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,167 the Supreme Court of New York ("SCNY")
reached a conclusion that relied on similar principles of ISP knowledge of
harmful content, but used those principles to hold Prodigy Services Company
responsible for content moderation on its site.'68
The Stratton Oakmont decision, if left on its own, would have created a
highly stringent standard for ISP tort liability. Prodigy Services Company
("Prodigy") was a widely utilized ISP whose business consisted wholly of
158 American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019).
159 Lothar Determann & Helena J. Engfeldt, Maine and Nevada's New Data Privacy Laws and
the California Consumer Privacy Act Compared, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 20, 2019),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/06/maine-and-nevada-new-data-
privacy-laws (explaining the provisions of Maine's Act to Protect the Privacy of Online Customer
Information and its focus on data collection as opposed to data use).
160 Rinehart, supra note 157.
161 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2020).
162 See generally Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
163 Id
164 Id.
165 Id. at 143.
166 Id. at 139.
167 No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
168 Id. at *7.
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message boards where users could post their thoughts without hinderance.169
There was no initial filtration system that placed any form of restriction on what
end users could post, but when Prodigy began to moderate its site content by
removing certain messages for "bad taste" or being "grossly repugnant to
community standards," the court seized the action as an opportunity to hold ISPs
liable for the entirety of the content on their sites 170 The resulting decision
proposed to force ISPs to take a completely hands-off approach to content
moderation in order to escape tort liability.
B. The Centrality of the First Amendment
In response to Stratton Oakmont, Congress recognized the negative
effect that the SCNY's decision would have on innovation and users' First
Amendment right to free speech. The CDA Section 230(c)(1) precludes ISPs
from tort liability and states that "no provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider." 171 In other words, Section 230(c)(1)
has allowed ISPs to function without fear of being reprimanded for the content
posted by end users, which could ultimately interfere with their entire business
model. The protection is limited by the caveat that if the ISP has helped create
content that enables criminal activity, safe harbor does not apply.
172 The CDA
was challenged the year after it went into effect, and part of it was struck down
by the Supreme Court for violating the First and Fifth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. In Reno v. ACL U,173 the CDA's general prohibition on
"indecent communications" was deemed to be unconstitutional because it did not
adequately distinguish between "indecent" versus "obscene" sexual expressions
as the First Amendment does, making the restriction overly broad.
17 4 The First
Amendment protects "indecent" speech, and therefore the CDA clause restricting
such speech was unconstitutional.75
Since the Reno decision, CDA Section 230 has given ISPs broad
immunity against tort claims. In 2003, Christine Carafano brought a private claim
against Matchmaker.com, claiming that a false profile was made in her name that
included her photos and resulted in her harassment by individuals who received
her contact information from the account.176 The injured party received sexually
169 Id. at *2.
170 Id.
171 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (West 2020).
172 Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 1805, 1839 (2010).
173 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
174 Id. at 883.
175 Id. at 874.
176 Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003).
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explicit text messages, phone calls, and e-mails as well as threats toward her and
her son.'77 Carafano alleged "invasion of privacy, misappropriation of the right
of publicity, defamation, and negligence."'7 8 Matchmaker.com was given
complete immunity from the claim both in the lower and appellate court under
Section 230.179 The court found that Matchmaker.com was not responsible for
the injury because while it provided a platform on which the profile could be
created and even aided users in creating profiles with a questionnaire, it had not
played a role in "creating, developing, or transforming the relevant
information."' 80
In a similar decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit again
upheld CDA Section 230 immunity for ISPs. The plaintiff in Barnes v. Yahoo!,
Inc.' 8 1 sued the ISP under a theory of negligent undertaking after it refused to
remove indecent content depicting her, which her boyfriend posted on the site.'8 2
The protections under Section 230 effectively barred the plaintiff's complaints
because it "precludes courts from treating Internet service providers as publishers
not just for the purposes of defamation law . .. but in general."'83 The decision
solidified the "court's position that ISPs could not be held liable even in
instances where speech violated other laws, such as defamation law.' 84
Section 230's preservation of online platforms' right to free speech is
illustrative of the deference that American legislators give to the First
Amendment over consumer protection interests. Until the middle of 2018, it was
perfectly legal for the government to obtain cell-site location information
("CSLI") from wireless carriers to be used as evidence against a defendant in a
criminal case. In the landmark decision Carpenter v. United States,185 the
Supreme Court held that the government would no longer be permitted to do this
without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.'86 The U.S. Constitution
provides that the people have a right to "be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures."'87 The Court had
also previously ruled that, for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, GPS
tracking of a vehicle also amounted to an unreasonable search.188 The use of
177 Id.
178 Id at 1122.
179 Mdat 1125.
180 Id.
181 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009).
182 Id. at 1099.
183 Id. at 1104.
184 Id
185 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
186 Id.
187 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
188 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412-13 (2012).
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CSLI by the government is akin to tracking a person's past movements over a
prolonged period of time, as is placing a GPS tracker on a car.
89 Therefore, the
government's arguments that the use of CSLI was constitutional because it was
obtained from a third party and protected under the Stored Communications
Act,' 90 were found to be implausible under the Fourth Amendment.'
91 The Court
concluded that if the government wanted to obtain CSLI data, it first needed to
obtain a warrant.192
However, Carpenter does nothing for private use of CSLI, making a
federal privacy regulation all the more necessary. Wireless carriers are still
participating in the sale of individuals' CSLI to third parties.'
93 While Carpenter
specifically restricts the government's use of prolonged tracking information,
there is no law in place to prevent the government from hiring a third party with
access to CSLI to track down an individual.1
94 Similarly, bail bondsmen and
related businesses, such as bounty hunters, have been found to have purchased
CSLI from big wireless carriers to carry out their business objectives.'
95
C. U.S. Litigation on Consumer Privacy
The high-profile Cambridge Analytica scandal'
96 involving social media
giant Facebook raised public concern in the U.S. and the U.K. over how personal
data was being used by tech companies. An estimated 87 million Facebook
profiles were mined for data that was later sold to the political data-analysis firm
Cambridge Analytica and was used to spread propaganda connected to the 2016
Trump campaign.197 Individuals' profiles were used to not only gain access to
189 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2209.
190 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (West 2020), invalidated in part by Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2210-
11.
191 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
192 Id.
193 SUSAN DENTE ROss, AMY REYNOLDS & ROBERT TRAGER, THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND
MASS COMMUNICATION 249-50 (6th ed. 2019).
194 Id.
195 Joseph Cox, Big Telecom Sold Highly Sensitive Customer GPS Data Typically Usedfor 911
Calls, VICE (Feb. 6, 2019, 5:11 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a3b3dg/big-telecom-
sold-customer-gps-data-911-calls.
196 Nicholas Iovino, Facebook Fights Multibillion-Dollar Privacy Class Action, COURTHOUSE
NEWS SERV. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/facebook-fights-multibillion-
dollar-privacy-class-action/.
197 Ikhlaq ur Rehman, Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Data Harvesting: What You Need To
Know, 2019 LIaR. PHIL. & PRAC. 7 (2019).
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their personal data, but also to their friends' data.198 Based on this data, users
were subjected to target messaging that influenced the outcome of the Trump
campaign, Brexit, and Kenya's presidential election.199 The situation led to a
massive class-action lawsuit in which the chief complaint200 was that Facebook
"improperly and without authorization" accessed and obtained users' personal
information in violation of a consent decree that had been levied against the
company in 2011 by the FTC.201
The class action suit resulting from the Cambridge Analytica breach was
brought under the "hacking" statute of the Stored Communications Act.202 That
statute states that "whoever .. . knowingly and with intent to defraud accesses a
protected computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access" will
bear the assigned punishment in Subsection (c) of its provisions.203 A single
violation under the statute could yield a fine of up to $1,000, adding up to a
maximum, but unlikely, amount of $70 billion as a penalty for improper privacy
practices.204 Facebook denied that it ever gave approval or had any formal
knowledge regarding the misuse of user data alleged in the class action.205
The company's denial of liability went so far as to prompt it to file a
motion to dismiss the class action complaint.206 Facebook claimed that none of
the members of the class who filed the complaint had suffered any harm, calling
the bases for the complaint "bizarre" and "ranging from drained cell phone
batteries to the election of President Trump."207 The motion also relied on users'
consent to third-party apps and targeted advertising as a defense to its
198 Jim Isaak & Mina J. Hanna, User Data Privacy: Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and
Privacy Protection, IEEE COMPUT. SOC'Y (Aug. 2018),
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8436400&tag=1.
199 Id.
200 Class Action Complaint at 2, Redmond v. Facebook, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-03642, 2018 WL
7047281 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2018).
201 Plaintiff's Consent Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary
Judgment, and Injunctive Relief, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02184 (D.D.C. July
24, 2019).
202 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2020).
203 Id.
204 Owen Bowcott & Alex Hem, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica Face Class Action
Lawsuit, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/apr/10/cambridge-
analytica-and-facebook-face-class-action-lawsuit.
205 Kalev Leetaru, The Problem Isn't Cambridge Analytica: It's Facebook, FORBES (Mar. 19,
2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/03/19/the-problem-isnt-cambridge-
analytica-its-facebook/#545ea3fD58a5.
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questionable privacy practices.208 When the controversy led to questions over
whether Facebook violated its 2011 consent decree, similar denials were offered
in a statement released by the company: "We reject any suggestion of violation
of the consent decree. We respected the privacy settings that people had in place.
Privacy and data protections are fundamental to every decision we make."
209
1. FTC Regulation of Facebook
The FTC consent decree bound Facebook to have a "comprehensive
privacy program" and "obtain express consent" from users before sharing their
data.21 0 Not only did the Cambridge Analytica incident bring Facebook's
compliance with the consent decree into question, but subsequent reports that the
company had arranged to share data with more than 150 companies also brought
further scrutiny.21 Where Facebook's denial that it had any knowledge of
Cambridge Analytica's abuse of user data may have had the possibility of acting
as a sound defense against the class action suit, the same cannot not have been
said regarding its agreements with these 150 third-party companies. These
companies were permitted to abuse and manipulate user data when Facebook
gave them permission to "read, write, and delete users' private messages."
2 12 In
defense of its behavior, Facebook attempted to explain away the allegations it
faced over these 150 "integration partnerships" by reasoning that they were
created "so people [could] use Facebook on devices and platforms that" the
company's service did not itself support.2 13
However, Facebook's statement failed to address the fact that users were
unaware of how much of their data was being provided to these "partners."
Facebook also neglected to address the fact that users were often unaware that
their data was being shared at all with third-party services.
2 15 The FTC found that
208 Id
209 Craig Timberg & Tony Romm, U.S. and British Lawmakers Demand Answers from
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these behaviors violated the FTC Act and an FTC order that Facebook had agreed
to in 2012.216 Under the 2012 order, Facebook was required to honor users'
privacy settings and choices or face litigation from the FTC.217 One of the
complaints that prompted the 2012 order involved users' freedom to choose
settings that allowed only their friends to access their information being negated
by Facebook's failure to disclose that the same information could be accessed by
third parties whose apps users' friends had installed.2 18 Investigations revealed
that even when users selected the most restrictive privacy settings, Facebook's
business practices still made users' personal data available to companies that
developed apps used by consumers' friends.2 19
The FTC's 2012 complaint also stated that Facebook's policy statement
regarding its use of facial recognition technology was misrepresented to
consumers. 220 The policy indicated that users would be automatically provided
with "tag suggestions" for photos only when users had facial recognition settings
turned on. When in reality, facial recognition was a default setting for all users.221
The language of the policy suggested that users would only be provided with
suggestions based on facial recognition if they opted in to the setting, but they
actually needed to opt out to protect their data from being used.22 Users were
further duped into providing the company with their personal phone numbers
under the guise of account recovery and security, but they were not informed that
their numbers would also be used to serve them with targeted ads.23
These complaints amassed to a record penalty of $5 billion against
Facebook for the aforementioned infractions.224 Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of
Facebook, has been heavily criticized for his company's lax data-privacy policies
and has even faced attempts by Facebook shareholders to hold him personally
liable to the company for breach of fiduciary duty.225 The penalty assigned by
the FTC also requires that Facebook implement measures to keep Zuckerberg's
power as CEO in check. The company's Board of Directors will be required to
216 Lesley Fair, FTC's $5 Billion Facebook Settlement: Record-Breaking and History-Making,
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create an independent privacy committee from which Facebook officers and
employees are excluded.226 The site's policies will also be amended to more
closely monitor third-party developers and refuse data access to any developer
that is non-compliant with the new policies.227
On the same day that it was dealt the $5 billion fine, Facebook also
publicly acknowledged that the FTC opened an antitrust investigation to the
sprawling social media landscape that is becoming the company's empire.
228
Google and Amazon are also included in the investigation
229 as their influence
raises similar antitrust concerns as Facebook's acquisition of smaller businesses
like Instagram and Whatsapp.
23o
2. Attorney General Racine's Lawsuit Against Facebook
Not only did the Cambridge Analytica scandal prompt federal litigation
against Facebook, but it also provoked a complaint from the Attorney General of
the District of Columbia, Karl Racine.231 Facebook is suspected to have had
knowledge of the data mining carried out by Cambridge Analytica and allowed
harm to befall consumers.23 2 The complaint alleges that Facebook violated the
D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act by deceiving users, neglecting to
properly monitor third-party apps, and using confusing language in its privacy
policy.23 3 Additionally, it is widely known that Facebook took more than two
years to disclose the details of the scandal to its consumers and the public, and
to this, Attorney General Racine argues that it had a duty to promptly notify
consumers of the breach.2 4 The motive behind the lawsuit is to "[make]
226 Fair, supra note 216.
227 Id
228 Steven Overly, Facebook Discloses FTC Antitrust Investigation Underway, POLITICO (July
14, 2019, 6:17 PM), https://www.politico.coml/story/2019/07/24/facebook-discloses-ftc-antitrust-
investigation-underway-1432927.
229 Id.
230 Mark Glick & Catherine Ruetschlin, Big Tech Acquisitions and the Potential Competition
Doctrine: The Case of Facebook 3-5 (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No. 104,
2019), https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP-104-Glick-and-Reut-Oct-10.pdf.
231 Complaint for Violations of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act, District of Columbia
v. Facebook, Inc., No. 2018-CA-008715-B (D.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Complaint
for Violations].
232 Hilary Tuttle, Facebook Scandal Raises Data Privacy Concerns, 65 RIsK MGMT. 6, 8-9
(2018) ("[Facebook] knew a third party was collecting user data.").
233 Complaint for Violations, supra note 231, at 3.
234 AG Racine Sues Facebook for Failing To Protect Millions of Users' Data, OFF. OF THE
Arr'Y GEN. FOR D.C. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://oag.dc.gov/release/ag-racine-sues-facebook-failing-
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[Vol. 123100
THE BALKANIZATION OF DATA PRIVACYREGULATION
Facebook live up to its promise to protect its users' privacy."2 35 The complaint
aims to have an injunction granted against Facebook to ensure that the
appropriate privacy safeguards are put in place as well as to encourage prompt
action that allows users to more effectively control their privacy settings on the
site.236 "Facebook's attorneys have made multiple attempts to have the
complaints dismissed, but D.C. Superior Court Judge Fern Saddler has not been
persuaded by their arguments that the case is not properly before the court and
that the action will not prove that there was company misconduct.237
3. Balkanization of State Privacy Regulations
Various states within the U.S. are choosing to enact their own privacy
regulations in the absence of a federal privacy law. For example, the State of
Washington has modelled its legislation by following the GDPR. The
Washington Privacy Act ("WPA") introduced in early 2019 proposed a new
standard for privacy in the state that closely mirrored various provisions of the
GDPR.238 Both instruments employed similar tactics for protecting privacy and
defined "personal data" as "any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person."239 The WPA also drew substantially on the
protections provided in the GDPR, providing rights such as the right to be
informed about what personal data is being collected, how it is used, and whether
it is sold, as well as the right to receive a copy of personal data being kept by a
data controller.240 The WPA cited various motivations for its regulations ranging
from constitutional protections to recent events such as data breaches involving
tech companies.24' The Act aimed to strike a balance between protecting
innovation and economic growth for businesses while also reinstituting
consumer confidence in those businesses when it comes to how their data is being
handled.242 The right to privacy protected in Article 1, Section 7 of the
Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
were relied on as the source of inviolable consumer rights that inspired the
creation of the WPA.243 The text of the Act also specifically assigned
235 Id.
236 Id
237 Andrew M. Harris & Daniel Stoller, Facebook Is Accused of Knowing Cambridge Mined Its
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responsibility to technology businesses for the recent "chilling of consumer
confidence" and "cost [to] Washington state businesses."
2
44 While the Act found
support in the state Senate, it was later quashed in the state House.
24 5 Had it
succeeded at the state legislature, the WPA would have been the second state
privacy regulation to be established in the U.S. after the CCPA.
246
One major issue with the WPA was its approach to the regulation of
facial recognition technology.247 Section 14 of the Act proposed that data
controllers obtain consent from consumers before making use of facial
recognition services and provide conspicuous notice to consumers regarding the
instances in which facial recognition technology would make use of their data.
248
Some critics argued that the regulation did not take enough action and that a
moratorium should be placed on the technology instead.
249 The one major way
that the WPA differed from the GDPR and CCPA was its failure to provide a
private right of action for data misuse.25 0 Therefore, while it purported to restore
consumer confidence in technology, it did not, even at a minimum, provide a
way for consumers to challenge businesses using their data in the event that the
WPA failed to provide adequate protection.
In contrast, the proposed New York Privacy Act ("NYPA") does provide
a private right of action for consumers, mirroring the provisions of the GDPR.
2 51
Consumers would have been enabled to sue companies directly for data breaches
and other infractions involving data misuse. It also would have implemented
GDPR-like transparency provisions which required companies to disclose to
consumers how their data was being used, the purpose for its collection, and
when and how data was shared with third parties.
22 Unlike the CCPA, which
aims to mitigate compliance costs for smaller tech businesses, the NYPA took
after the GDPR in indiscriminately applying its provisions to all businesses that
collect consumer data, regardless of size.2
3 The provisions were applied so
244 Id.
245 Lucas Ropek, Why Did Washington State's Privacy Legislation Collapse?, Gov'T TECH.
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broadly that even nonprofit institutions would have been affected by its
passage.5 4 This is a particular concern held by critics of state privacy regulations
who fear that compliance costs could cause smaller start-up business who do not
have adequate financial resources for compliance to fail as a result of laws like
the NYPA. 55
The NYPA's imposition of a fiduciary duty on businesses also caused
concern among critics by shifting the burden of data protection on businesses
instead of placing it on consumers by giving them a say in how their data is
handled.256 This would have required businesses to take on a role more akin to
that of healthcare providers, who are prohibited from selling data to
pharmaceutical companies.25 7 These concerns, coupled with the criticism that the
NYPA's passage would create an even stricter state privacy regulation than the
CCPA, caused the NYPA to ultimately fail to pass into law at the state
legislature.258 It is likely that the inspiration behind the creation of a fiduciary
duty came from Facebook's misleading data privacy language which duped
consumers into providing their personal information for marketing purposes
under the guise of protection.259 Since giant tech companies like Facebook have
become so integrated into consumers' lives, they have left consumers with no
choice besides sharing their personal information. It makes sense that businesses
should then have a responsibility to carefully handle sensitive data.260
The Massachusetts Act Relative to Consumer Data Privacy updates the
data breach laws that the state previously had in place and brings the law closer
to the GDPR standard for data protection.2 6' Like the NYPA, the proposed
Massachusetts law provides a right of action and does not require the plaintiff to
have suffered a financial or material harm in order to file a claim.262 As with
https://jost.syr.edu/landmark-data-privacy-legislation-serves-as-a-benchmark-in-a-rapidly-
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other proposed state privacy regulations, the Massachusetts Act creates various
rights for consumers.263 These rights include the right to request deletion of
collected personal information (the right to be forgotten); the right to request a
copy of collected personal information; and the right to notice "at or before the
point of collection" of the personal information that will be collected and
disclosed and the purpose of such collection or disclosure.
2" It also mirrors the
GDPR in that consumers may prevent businesses from disclosing their
information to third parties.265 The bill is yet to be adopted but has been hailed
as one of the "tougher" laws that demands more from businesses when protecting
consumer privacy.
One of the most important updates to state privacy laws is Delaware's
2017 update to its data-breach notification law.
266 Like the GDPR, Delaware's
privacy law requires businesses to maintain updated, proactive security policies
and procedures for its handling of personal data.
267 It also expands the definition
of "personal information" to include various different types of data that the
GDPR also governs, such as medical information, biometric data, and electronic
signatures.268 Additional breach notification requirements are imposed on
businesses as well, which is important considering the number of technology
businesses that are incorporated in the state of Delaware.269 In terms of scope,
Delaware's laws mirror the GDPR by applying to all businesses that conduct
business in the state.270 However, unlike the GDPR, yet similar to some of the
other proposed state provisions, it does not provide a private right of action which
limits liability for some of the larger companies that have breached data privacy







266 H.B. 180, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2017).
267 Id at 1.
268 Id. at 3.
269 Id. at4.
270 Id.
271 David Krone, Delaware Amends Data Breach Notification Law To Require Reasonable
Data Security and Expand the Scope of Personal Information Requiring Notice, TECH. L. DISPATCH




2020] THE BALKANIZA TION OF DATA PRIVACY REGULATION
V. THREE COMPARISONS OF DATA PRIVACY REGULATION
A. Comparing Regulatory Choices
1. Opt-in versus Opt-out
The CCPA was created to address not only the global shift toward
privacy regulation ignited by the GDPR but also the prevention of future harm
to consumers that could arise from another situation like the Cambridge
Analytica scandal.272 Though the CCPA was certainly inspired in part by the
GDPR, it does not necessarily follow that compliance with one will amount to
compliance with the other. The two regulations take different approaches in
scope, obligations imposed on businesses, and consumer ights.273 Some of these
differences stem from the fact that the CCPA limits its application to California,
whereas the GDPR is applicable in multiple countries, but also from the fact that
U.S. and European values differ with respect to priorities in data-privacy
regulation. For instance, the U.S. has historically protected the right to free
speech, including the free speech of non-natural persons (specifically ISPs as
evidenced by Section 230 of the CDA),274 whereas Europe has often taken the
approach that individual rights should be the primary consideration when
crafting privacy regulations.275
In practice, these differences translate into the two 'different basic user
consent mechanisms. While the GDPR and the CCPA both revolve around
requirements that mandate that businesses get users consent on certain data
collection and processing activities, consent mechanisms provided by the laws
significantly differ in terms of opt-in and opt-out options.276 Opt-in is the process
that describes the positive action in which a user takes an affirmative action to
offer their consent.277 The most common way we see opt-in methods
implemented is through checkboxes, where the users take action by checking the
box that denotes their consent.278 On the other hand, opt-out is the process in
which a user withdraws or refuses consent for certain actions to be carried out.2 79
Users with an opt-out option can uncheck a marked box or withdraw consent by
changing their preferences after the original point of consent. Under the GDPR,
272 Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law,
104 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2020).
273 Id
274 47 U.S.C.A § 230 (West 2020).
275 Chander et al., supra note 272.
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279 Chander et al., supra note 272.
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users' consent must be opt-in through affirmative action, instead of opt-out.
280
Although the GDPR does not specifically ban opt-out consent, the Information
Commissioner's Office ("ICO") says that opt-out options "are essentially the
same as pre-ticked boxes, which are banned."
2 81 On the other hand, the CCPA
allows opt-out options in certain cases. It provides for the ability to opt out of the
sale of personal information for individuals 16 years of age or older while
requiring businesses to gather opt-in consent for children younger than 16 years
old from either the children (if they are 13+ years old) or from their parent or
guardian.
The respective scopes of the GDPR and the CCPA also differ in their
application to businesses, or "data controllers and processors." The GDPR's
reach is significantly broader as it applies to data subjects generally, which the
law defines as "identified or identifiable natural persons."
282 Therefore, the
GDPR's protection is not limited to citizens of the EU. In contrast, the CCPA
protects consumers that are California residents regardless of whether they
presently reside in the state or are outside of the state for a "temporary or
transitory purpose."283 It does not lend the same protection to individuals who
are residing in California on a temporary basis.
284 The CCPA also does not afford
protection to personal data in all circumstances as the GDPR seems to, but is
instead limited to the data of consumers who are customers of household goods
and services, employees, and businesses participating in business-to-business
transactions.28s
Both laws have extraterritorial effects. The CCPA protects California
residents even outside of the state, while the GDPR applies to all data controllers
and processors that are either established in the EU or that process data in
connection with offering goods and services in the EU.
2 86 However, as a state-
specific provision, the CCPA only applies to for-profit entities doing business in
California that have a gross revenue exceeding $25 million; annually buy,
receive, sell, or share, the personal data of more than 50,000 consumers; and








282 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 4.
283 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18 § 17014 (2020).
284 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2020).
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286 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 3.
287 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c).
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The GDPR and CCPA also take different approaches to specific
protections regarding children. The CCPA is beholden to standards for juvenile
protection that already exist within the U.S. For instance, the COPPA is not
nullified by the existence of the CCPA, but rather, the CCPA adds to the existing
federal protections. The CCPA prohibits the sale of personal information of any
consumer under the age of 16 without consent.288 Children between the ages of
13-16 can provide consent to data processing of their own volition, but to process
data for children younger than 13, businesses must necessarily obtain the
'parents' consent.289 The GDPR similarly restricts the ages at which children may
provide consent to data processing. But instead of setting a range, it sets a default
for consent at age 16 and allows Member States to tailor their provisions and to
lower the age to as young as 13.290 This also results in variable standards in the
EU for this and other provisions that allow state-specific tailoring. The EU also
goes a step further in requiring that children who are able to consent to data
processing receive an age-appropriate privacy notice, ensuring that they
understand how their data will be used.2 91
The GDPR also creates specific rights for individuals, whereas the
CCPA either provides no comparable right or substantially less rights. The
GDPR provides a robust right to data subjects to access their personal data,
including receiving copies of their personal data and obtaining information on
the data processing procedures of data controllers.292 The CCPA only allows
consumers to request disclosure of their personal information, which is limited
to a written disclosure.2 93 The right to be forgotten is protected under both laws,
but the CCPA gives businesses much more autonomy in deciding whether to
refuse the request while the GDPR provides six distinct instances in which a
consumer can request deletion.94 Both laws require that a valid request to data
deletion is followed by a reasonable effort to instruct other data processors or
service providers to delete the same individual's information.295 The GDPR also
secures individuals' right to rectification of incorrect or incomplete personal data
or to restrict processing of personal data under certain circumstances.296 The
CCPA provides no comparable right in this regard aside from the right to opt-out
in instances where one's personal information is being sold to third parties,
288 Id §§ 1798.120(c)-(d).
289 Id.
290 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 8.
291 Id
292 Id art. 15.
293 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d).
294 Id § 1798.105; GDPR, supra note 1, art. 17.
295 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105; GDPR, supra note 1, art. 17.
296 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 18.
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another provision meant to protect against instances of data mishandling like that
of Facebook and Cambridge 'Analytica in 2016.297
Private rights of action differ substantially under the two laws, the
'CCPA being the narrower of the two. Under the GDPR, an individual may bring
a private right of action for any damage, material or non-material, caused by a
data processor or controller that breaches the law.
298 Only certain circumstances
allow for private rights of action under the CCPA.
2 99 Additionally, companies
are given considerable flexibility under the CCPA compared to the GDPR and
are allowed a 30-day period within which to cure any data violations, preempting
a right of action.30 0 Damages are also limited under the CCPA and range from
$100 to $750 per consumer per incident.
30 1 In lieu of monetary damages, a U.S.
court may also opt to provide injunctive relief under the CCPA.
302 Violations of
either law could amount to significant financial liabilities for companies.
Specifically, civil penalties can result in fines ranging from $2,500 to $7,500
under the CCPA303 whereas administrative fines under the GDPR are capped at
E20 million, or 4% of annual global revenue, whichever is highest.
304 EU
Member States also have the option to impose unique penalties that are not
subject to administrative fines for violations of the GDPR.
30 5
2. Deletion versus Erasure
The GDPR and CCPA also present technical differences regarding data
deletion. The GDPR provides users "right to erasure" which entails data subjects'
right to have their personal data removed from a controller and/or processor.
306
The CCPA similarly provides California residents "right to deletion," which
allows subjects to request that a business delete any personal information about
the subject that the business has collected from them.
307
The GDPR provides users right to erasure, which has been associated
with the right to be forgotten.308 Under the GDPR Article 17, data subjects have
the right to request erasure of personal data under six circumstances. Once
297 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120.
298 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 82.




303 Id. § 1798.155.
304 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 83-84.
305 Id. art. 83.
306 Id. art. 17.
307 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105.
308 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 17.
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requested, data controllers must also take reasonable steps, taking into account
available technology and the means available to the controller, including
technical measures, to inform any other data controllers also processing the data
that the data subject has requested the erasure of any links to, or copy or
replication of, that personal data.30 9 In practice, this means that data collectors
are expected to take reasonable steps, by implementing technical measures, to
inform other websites that a particular individual has requested the erasure of his
or her personal data. However, this right to erasure is not an absolute right.
Article 17 of the GDPR provides six cases in which the data subject may request
the erasure of his or her personal data.3 10
The CCPA also provides a similar right to consumers to request deletion
of their personal information. However, the request can only be made regarding
data that has been collected from them directly by the California business.31 In
other words, unlike the GDPR, data deletion under the CCPA can be requested
only if the data is directly collected by the business. Following Senate Bill 1121,
consumers can access this right in a "form that is reasonably accessible."3 12 Once
data deletion is requested, the business must instruct its service providers to
delete the data.
While an individual can request that his or her personal information is
deleted under either law, what differentiates the two laws is the conditions under
which a deletion request can be refused. The GDPR gives five such exemptions,
which are all shared by the CCPA with one exception. The CCPA adds an
exemption when maintaining the personal information is necessary for reasons
of public health. However, in addition to the GDPR's list of exemptions, the
grounds for refusal by businesses for data deletion is broader under the CCPA,
as it provides nine exceptions to the right of the consumer to delete information.
Namely, the CCPA includes the so-called "First Amendment exception," which
provides exemption for requests if they interfere with a right to "[e]xercise free
speech, ensure the right of another consumer to exercise that consumer's right of
free speech, or exercise another right provided for by law."313
309 Id. This is the main difference between GDPR and CCPA, and the reason why it's called
the "right to be forgotten." Personal data must be deleted not only from the website of which the
data subject requested the erasure, but also from other websites, links, copies, etc. ensuring total
erasure from the Internet.
310 Id.
31 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105.
312 Id. § 1798.130.
313 Id. § 1798.105(d)(4).
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B. Technology Perspective: Portability Across the Atlantic
The adoption of new data protection laws has led to the introduction of
new rights for data subjects. Data portability stands out among these rights.
3 14
The goal of portability is, on the one hand, to foster information rights and, on
the other hand, to promote a level playing field in the flow of data across the
internal market. Indeed, data portability would allow individuals to enjoy a
broader framework of informational self-determination,
315 and would also
constitute a limit to the increasing power of some business over personal data.
3 16
The GDPR recognizes the right of the data subjects to receive their
personal data in a structured, commonly used, and machine-readable format as
well as the right to transmit that data to another controller without hindrance from
the controller from which the personal data was provided. In other words, data
portability would be a two step-right: first, the users should receive their personal
data and, second, the data controller is required to transmit it. This right is not
absolute but is instead balanced with other fundamental interests, especially
those of natural persons and of the data controller. The GDPR clarifies that the
right to data portability "shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of
others."317 Likewise, the GDPR provides another wide balancing clause to
protect the exercise of the right of erasure. This is why portability is a different
concept; it does not involve the erasure of data, but instead, the transmission of
data. Therefore, the data subjects can enforce both rights against the data
controller according to the conditions which limit the application of both data
subjects' rights.
The GDPR specifies that the right to data portability applies only when
the processing is carried out by automated means and is based on consent
318 or
on a contractual agreement.319 These two conditions balance other conflicting
interests, especially that of the data controller, and limit portability to just two
legal bases of processing. This excludes portability in cases of compliance with
a legal obligation to which the controller is subject 0 and in cases of protecting
314 See Paul De Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Gianclaudio Malgieri, Laurent Beslay et al.,
The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards User-Centric Interoperability of Digital
Services, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REv. 193 (2018).
31 See Gabriella Zanfir-Fortuna, The Right to Data Portability in the Context of the EU Data
Protection Reform, 2 INT'L DATA PRIv. L. 149 (2012).
316 See Bart van der Sloot, Do Data Protection Rules Protect he Individual and Should They?
An Assessment of the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation, 4 INT'L DATA PRuv. L. 307
(2014).
317 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 20(4).
318 Id. art. 9(2)(a).
319 Id. art. 6(1)(b).
320 Id. art. 6(1)(c).
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the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person.32' Moreover,
the data controller is required to transmit the data according to the data subjects'
request only if technically feasible. The right to data portability does not require
data controllers to implement processing systems which are technically
compatible with other organizations.32 2 This information should be provided free
of charge.3 23 Nevertheless, where requests from a data subject are manifestly
unfounded or excessive, in particular because of their repetitive character, the
controller may charge a reasonable fee, taking into account the administrative
costs of providing the information or communication or taking the action
requested. The controller may also refuse to act on the request. In both cases, the
controller should be able to demonstrate that data subjects' requests were
manifestly unfounded or excessive.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the CCPA also deals with data
portability.324 In particular, it provides a two-step scheme, similar to the GDPR.
When receiving a verifiable consumer request to access personal information,
businesses hall promptly take steps to disclose and deliver, free of charge to the
consumer, the personal information required.325 The delivery of this information
could be performed by electronic means and, in this case, the information shall
also be provided "in a portable and, to the extent technically feasible, readily
useable format that allows the consumer to transmit this information to another
entity without hindrance."326 If technically feasible, the technical format should
enable the transmission of the information to another entity due to its readily
useable format.327 Nevertheless, the CCPA limits portability when the number of
requests from the same consumers exceeds two in a 12-month period.328
The CCPA also specifies that the disclosure of information to the
consumer shall cover the 12-month period preceding the business's receipt of the
request. This information should be delivered in writing through "the consumer's
account with the business . . . or by mail or electronically at the consumer's
option .. . in a readily useable format that allows the consumer to transmit this
information from one entity to another entity without hindrance."329 Businesses
shall disclose and deliver the information to consumers within 45 days of
receiving a verifiable consumer equest from the consumer.330 The business shall
321 Id art. 6(l)(d).
322 Id. recital 68.
323 Id art. 12(5).
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promptly take steps to determine whether the request is a verifiable consumer
request.33' However, this assessment does not extend the limit of 45 days;
instead, the time period to provide the required information may be extended
only once by an additional 45 days when reasonably necessary, provided the
consumer is provided notice of the extension within the first 45-day period.
332
There are several similarities between the CCPA and the GDPR when it
comes to the right to data portability. Both the CCPA and the GDPR allow data
subjects and consumers to rely on this right to obtain access to data and to
transmit it to another data controller. Nevertheless, there are also relevant
differences. One of the most evident examples consists of the lack of obligation
for businesses to transmit data to other business. Indeed, the CCPA would leave
this transmission to consumers' responsibility, thus exempting businesses from
any responsibility concerning the transmission of consumers' data. From a
broader perspective, the different constitutional standpoints of the two
instruments leads to two different interpretations of "portability." In the EU
framework, the data subject's rights also express constitutional values enshrined
in supranational charters; in the U.S. framework, this right still reflects an
economic dimension linked to the relationship between businesses and
consumers.
Data portability can be an opportunity to foster the role of data subjects
and consumers respectively vis-a-vis data controllers and businesses. In other
words, it would allow the move from a vertical and asymmetrical relationship to
a horizontal standpoint where individuals can rely on new rights in the
information society. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the general
exercise of this right is not without any consequences. The GDPR shows to be
aware of the risks of an uncontrolled spread of this right for the business sector,
which is why this right has been limited according to specific conditions aimed
to protect data controllers and the fundamental rights of other data subjects.
C. Political Economy Perspective: Privatization or Public Enforcement?
New rules and their effectiveness are not the only concern at stake in the
field of data protection. The Balkanization of data protection law is not just a
matter of fragmentation of rules around the world. Even more importantly, one
of the primary issues is the increasing consolidation of the role of private
businesses (e.g., online platforms) in the enforcement of public policies online.
The growing trend toward the recognition of private actors with functions
traditionally vested in public authorities cannot be ignored. The Google Spain v.
AEPD case has already shown how the lack of norms could not always impede
public actors from recognizing new obligations for private actors (in this case, a
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Nonetheless, this general trend is not without consequences. In Google Spain,
the reasoning of the court has not only entrusted a business actor with the
decision over users' request of delisting, but it has also failed to take into
consideration the burden that such an obligation would raise for search engines.
While the e-Commerce directive exempts providers from a general obligation to
monitor, the court extends its framework of liability by horizontally interpreting
data protection law in light of the constitutional protection recognized by Articles
7 and 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The ECJ has delegated
to private actors (i.e., Internet search engine service providers) that carry out
activities of public interest, balancing the right to information and the right to be
forgotten.
Beyond the right to be forgotten, the GDPR has even extended the role
of private actors by introducing a flexible notion of responsibility and risks under
the notion of accountability."3 The GDPR has opened the doors toward a
comprehensive, risk-based approach, especially based on the principle of
accountability of the data controller. As analyzed above, the principle of
accountability requires the controller to prove compliance with the GDPR's
principles by establishing safeguards and limitations based on the specific
context of the processing, especially considering the risks for data subjects. This
recognition leads the data controller to play a crucial role in concretely deciding
how to apply the rules established by the GDPR based on an internal (and ex-
ante) assessment of the risks to data subjects. This tendency towards privatization
of enforcement is compelling and does not belong only to the realm of data
protection but also in the framework of speech.33 4 More specifically, the ability
of online platforms to moderate content while maintaining their exemption of
liability is a clear example of how private enforcement is spreading across
sectors.335
This situation is not neutral from a political economy perspective. In the
digital realm, as underlined by Pasquale, digital firms are no longer market
participants since they "aspire to displace more government roles over time,
replacing the logic of territorial sovereignty with functional sovereignty." 336
Platforms like Facebook or Google can be easily compared to entire regions of
33 GDPR, supra note 1, art. 5.
33 See Giovanni De Gregorio, Democratising Online Content Moderation: A Constitutional
Framework, 36 COMPUT. L. & SEc. REV. 105374 (2020).
335 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REv. 1598 (2018)
336 Frank Pasquale, From Territorial to Functional Sovereignty: The Case of Amazon, LPE
PROJECT: BLOG (Dec. 6, 2017), https://lpeproject.org/blog/from-territorial-to-functional-
sovereignty-the-case-of-amazon/.
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the world,337 and have been defined as "company-town."
338 Therefore, the ability
of U.S. states to deal with data protection issues is not just a matter of the
complexity in regulating new technological frameworks, but also from the public
dependency from the private sector for reasons of surveillance or other public
purposes.339
Balkanization, therefore, does not involve only legal fragmentation, but
also the increasing blurred lines between the public and private realms. The
increasing overlaps between these two dimensions leads to wondering if there
are remedies that can be proposed to face this imbalance of power in the field of
data. The U.S. approach does not seem to be concerned with these risks, and the
lack of federal legislation is one of the examples. Nonetheless, even if the GDPR
constitutes a crucial step forward in the EU policies, it has just mitigated the
increasing power of business actors in the private sector without solving the
current situation of Balkanization. The GDPR still shows fallacies that would be
hard to face with a lack of regulatory adjustments. It is true that the ECJ has not
had many opportunities to interpret the GDPR framework to face the
aforementioned situation, but relying just on judicial activism could lead to
increasing the process of fragmentation, undermining legal certainty.
In Google Spain SL v. AEPD,340 the ECJ interpreted the scope of
application of the right to be forgotten by clarifying that EU law does not require
a search engine to delist content globally. It is for a Member State to make this
decision at the domestic level. This decision was based on the risks that a global
extension of delisting would have led to consequences for the protection of
freedom of expression from an international perspective. The right of freedom of
expression does not enjoy the same degree of protection across the world.
Despite restricting an individual's right, this decision would lead to a more
controlled framework over private enforcement. In other words, this decision is
an important step for the role of public actors in the information society. This
approach would indeed foster the principle of the rule of law by providing more
guidelines of the right to be forgotten online in the field. It is true that the right
to delist could be limited just to EU territory, but the increase of legal certainty
would lead to positive consequences for the protection of rights and freedoms on
a global scale. However, this approach, which would lead to a turning point
fostering the rule of law, is still at the beginning stages, but it is likely to become
the standard in the information society.
337 See Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1807 (2012).
338 Tal Zarsky, Social Justice, Social Norms and the Governance of Social Media, 35 PACE L.
REv. 154, 166 (2015).
339 See Niva Elkin-Koren & Eldar Haber, Governance by Proxy: Cyber Challenges to Civil
Liberties, 82 BROOK. L. REv. 105 (2016).
340 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espafola de Protecci6n de Datos,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, ¶ 80 (May 13, 2014).
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VI. CONCLUSION
As scholars have shown, particularly through analyzing the laws in
Brussels and California, the diffusion of the GDPR in terms of business
compliance and circulation of regulatory ideas has influenced businesses and
progressive legal practices worldwide. However, when addressing the reception
of the GDPR by U.S. regulators and looking into administrative path
dependencies, the political economy behind data privacy regulations, and the
way in which Silicon Valley companies have spurred technological innovations,
a comparison between EU and U.S. data privacy regimes shows that rather than
convergence, we are likely to see Balkanization of regulations. Such
fragmentation might lead to an increased workload for lawyers committed to
data-privacy compliance, increasing litigation before courts through a variety of
regulatory paths and reflecting the compromises made by regulators, courts,
consumers, and businesses vis a vis the different political economic models and
culture in which they are embedded.
The challenges raised by the Balkanization of data-protection laws are
not just linked to legal certainty and the rule of law due to the increasing overlap
between different systems across the globe. It is also a matter of decentralization
of powers towards private actors operating on a global scale. This does not imply
that the issue of Balkanization does not involve fragmentation and related
consequences for data protection legal framework. But, focusing just on legal
certainty could provide a partial picture of the asymmetries of powers which
affect the political economy. Before these challenges, the phenomenon of
Balkanization led legal scholars to find answers to mitigate the aforementioned
situation. In different ways, the GDPR and CCPA have tried to provide answers
to these challenges. They provide converging solutions to the issue of data
protection in the information society, even if the two approaches are naturally
characterized by a different constitutional framework and political view over the
horizontal exercise of powers between private actors.
It is time to find common principles, which can harmonize data-
protection law on a global scale. This process should not be guided only by
important regulatory choices like extending the territorial scope of the
application of the GDPR or opt-in versus opt-out mechanisms, but also a broader
public policy goal to find a common framework that can provide enforceable
rights to individuals or collectivities participating in a more egalitarian digital
economy and democratic digital public sphere.
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